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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
LAWYERS, A CASE STUDY
Elizabeth Chambliss"
INTRODUCTION
In my preceding chapters I have tried, by going into the minutiae of
the science of piloting, to carry the reader step by step to a
comprehension of what the science consists of; and at the same time
I have tried to show him that it is a very curious and wonderful
science, too, and very worthy of his attention. If I have seemed to
love my subject, it is no surprising thing, for I loved the profession
far better than any I have followed since, and I took a measureless
pride in it. The reason is plain: a pilot, in those days, was the only
unfettered and entirely independent human being that lived in the
earth. Kings are but the hampered servants of parliament and
people; parliaments sit in chains forged by their constituency; the
editor of a newspaper cannot be independent, but must work with
one hand tied behind him by party and patrons, and be content to
utter only half or two-thirds of his mind; no clergyman is a free man
and may speak the whole truth, regardless of his parish's opinions;
writers of all kinds are manacled servants of the public. We write
frankly and fearlessly, but then we "modify" before we print. In
truth, every man and woman and child has a master, and worries and
frets in servitude; but, in the day I write of, the Mississippi pilot had
none. The captain could stand upon the hurricane-deck, in the pomp
of a very brief authority, and give him five or six orders while the
vessel backed into the stream, and then that skipper's reign was
over. The moment that the boat was underway in the river, she was
under the sole and unquestioned control of the pilot. He could do
with her exactly as he pleased, run her when and whither he chose,
and tie her up to the bank whenever his judgment said that that
course was best. His movements were entirely free; he consulted no
one, he received commands from nobody, he promptly resented
even the merest suggestions. Indeed, the law of the United States
forbade him to listen to commands or suggestions, rightly
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considering that the pilot necessarily knew better how to handle the
boat than anybody could tell him.'
Mark Twain arguably was the first American sociologist of the
professions. Twain took his literary name from his profession, or at
least from his favorite profession, riverboat piloting. He recalls the
"rank and dignity of piloting"3 with great affection in Life on the
Mississippi, and at the same time offers a sociological primer on the
stages of professional development. He explains how the pilots
formed a voluntary association for sharing (and hoarding) up-to-the-
minute knowledge about the conditions of the mighty river.4 He
describes how association pilots refused to work with non-association
pilots,5 and how the pilots' association gradually gained control over
the training and licensing of new pilots.6 And he laments the decline
of the pilots' association from "the compactest monopoly in the world,
perhaps" to an association of the "dead and pathetic past" with the
diversion of passenger travel to the railroad.7
I start my class on professional responsibility with Twain's book for
two reasons: it explains the dynamics of professional development in
a brief and humorous way, thus serving as an accessible overview to
the various topics in the course; and it focuses on a profession other
than the legal profession, which invites students to approach the class
theoretically. In this essay, I pitch the advantages of this sociological
approach to teaching professional responsibility. I argue that by
focusing on the professions generally, and treating the legal profession
as an extended case study, students end up better-equipped to
recognize and address the ethical and regulatory challenges
confronting individual lawyers, law firm managers, and the profession
as a whole.
Part I of the essay describes several problems with the traditional
approach to teaching professional responsibility. Part II explains how
the sociological approach improves on the traditional approach, and
defines the basic themes of a "sociological" course. Part III responds
to potential objections to the sociological approach, and explains how
a sociological course can be organized to satisfy traditional coverage
requirements.
1. Mark Twain, Life on the Mississippi 118-19 (Harper & Bros. ed., 1917) (1874)
(emphasis omitted).
2. "Mark twain" means two fathoms in piloting jargon. Id. at 66 n.2.
3. Id. at 118-26.
4. See id. at 127-42.
5. Id. at 136-37.
6. Id. at 138-39.
7. Id. at 141-42.
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I. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH
The traditional course on professional responsibility focuses on the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct,8 one rule at a time. Typically,
particular attention is devoted to the rules governing conflicts of
interest, the lawyer's duty of confidentiality, and the difference
between the duty of confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege.
Most students expect the course to prepare them for the Multistate
Professional Responsibility Exam (MPRE),9 and most teachers defer
in whole or in part to this consumer demand. (This is, of course, a
caricature; 10 or what sociologists call an "ideal type."")
There are a number of drawbacks to this approach. First, it assumes
the centrality of professional discipline within the regulatory system,
when in fact most scholars and practitioners would agree that
professional discipline is only marginally relevant to lawyers' day-to-
day conduct and the management of professional organizations such
as law firms.'2 The vast majority of disciplinary actions are brought
against solo practitioners, 3 who constitute a small (and diminishing)
8. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct (1983) [hereinafter Model Rules].
9. The MPRE is a 50-question multiple choice test covering the ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
and the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct. It is required for bar admission in 47 states
(all but Maryland, Washington, and Wisconsin). See Leslie C. Levin, The MPRE
Reconsidered, 86 Ky. L. 395, 395 n.2, 396, 409 (1997-98).
10. As a caricature, it would require many footnotes, documenting the tradition
but at the same time acknowledging the many variations on it, and lauding recent
pedagogical and curricular innovations. If the reader will indulge me, I will sidestep
this exercise by defending my characterization of the "traditional approach" as an
ideal type.
11. An ideal type is an intellectual construction (such as "bureaucracy" or "the
competitive market") that is not intended to represent reality, but rather to help
make sense of it intellectually. To construct an ideal type, the observer selects certain
defining characteristics and exaggerates them to form a coherent construction against
which to compare reality. "Ideal" signifies pure, or abstract, rather than normatively
desirable. Nicholas Abercrombie et al., The Penguin Dictionary of Sociology 104 (2d
ed. 1984).
12 See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59
Tex. L. Rev. 639, 642 (1981) (arguing that "the Model Rules are drafted with an
amorphousness and ambiguity that render them virtually meaningless"); Deborah L
Rhode, The Rhetoric of Professional Reform, 45 Md. L Rev. 274, 288-93 (1986)
(arguing that disciplinary committees are inherently biased in favor of lawyers);
David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers? 105 Harv. L Rev. 801, 867 (1992)
(arguing that "disciplinary controls do little more than mirror the norms of the
marketplace"); American Bar Association, Comm'n on Evaluation of Disciplinary
Enforcement, Report to House of Delegates xxii (1991) [hereinafter McKay Report]
(noting that the funding and staffing of disciplinary committees "have not kept pace
with the growth of the profession," and that "some agencies are so underfunded and
understaffed that they offer little protection against unethical lawyers"). See also
Ronald Pipkin, Law School Instruction in Professional Responsibility: A Curricular
Paradox, 1979 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 247, 272-75 (arguing that the traditional course
on professional responsibility is largely irrelevant to the actual practice of law).
13. In 1981-82, over 80% of those disciplined in California, Illinois and the
District of Columbia were solo practitioners, and none practiced in a firm with seven
20001
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fraction of all lawyers, 4 and the vast majority of complaints are
dismissed with "little or no investigation.' ' 15 Penalties for those few
lawyers who are disciplined tend to be exceedingly light. 16 Meanwhile,
lawyers who work in medium-sized and large law firms are practically
immune from professional discipline.'
Second, the traditional approach implicitly provides a distorted
empirical picture of the profession. Given the overwhelming focus on
conflicts and confidentiality, someone who did not know better might
imagine that the legal profession is made up primarily of migrating,
large firm lawyers and criminal defense attorneys. 8 Most casebooks
or more lawyers. See Richard L. Abel, American Lawyers 145 (1989) [hereinafter
Abel, American Lawyer]. See also Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law
Firms?, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 6 n.39 (1991) [hereinafter Schneyer, Professional
Discipline] (noting that the incidence of professional discipline tends to be higher in
rural areas where solo practitioners and small firm lawyers predominate).
14. The percentage of lawyers engaged in solo practice has dropped dramatically
in recent years. Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 179, 300 (reporting a
nationwide drop from 61.2% in 1948 to 33.2% in 1980) and 179, 346 n.126 (reporting
that the percentage of solo practitioners in Illinois dropped from 24% in 1975 to 13%
in 1982, citing 1982 Survey of Illinois Lawyers, 72 Ill. Bar J. 115, 127-29 (Nov. 1983)).
A 1991 random survey of California lawyers found that only about 25% were engaged
in solo practice. See Elizabeth Chambliss, Miles to Go 2000: Progress of Minorities in
the Legal Profession, ABA Commission on Ethnic and Racial Diversity in the
Profession 6 (2000) [hereinafter Chambliss (2000)] (citing SRI, Demographic Survey
of the State Bar of California 19 (1991)). Only 1.9% (613) of 1998 law graduates
(31,830) entered solo practice upon graduation. See National Association for Law
Placement, Jobs & J.D.'s: Employment and Salaries of New Law Graduates, Class of
1998 13, 28 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 NALP Report].
15. Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 147 (reporting that over 90% of
disciplinary complaints are dismissed).
16. Id. at 145-50 (reviewing the frequency and severity of sanctions resulting from
disciplinary actions). In 1986, only 1,147 out of 54,600 complaints nationwide resulted
in disbarment or suspension (2.1%). Id. at 291. See also William T. Gallagher,
Ideologies of Professionalism and the Politics of Self-Regulation in the California State
Bar, 22 Pepp. L. Rev. 485, 538-39 (1995) (noting that a six-month investigation of the
lawyer discipline system in California in the 1980s found that over 80% of complaints
received by the bar remained uninvestigated; few investigations led to any disciplinary
action against an attorney; and most discipline, when it did occur, consisted of minor
sanctions, such as a private reprimand).
17. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers in large and even medium-sized firms
are very rare; yet, judging by the frequency with which large firms and large firm
lawyers are the target of civil suits, motions to disqualify, and sanctions under the
rules of civil procedure, misconduct occurs with some regularity in those firms. See
Schneyer, Professional Discipline, supra note 13, at 6-7. In response to blatant ethics
violations committed by "partners at major establishment law firms," the American
Bar Association Section on Litigation convened a task force to study the problem. See
Lawrence J. Fox et al., Report, Ethics: Beyond the Rules: Historical Preface, 67
Fordham L. Rev. 691, 691 (1998).
18. In 1991, the most recent year for which national data are available, 72.9% of
all lawyers were in private practice, and only 12.6% of these lawyers worked in firms
of 101 lawyers or more. See Barbara A. Curran & Clara N. Carson, The Lawyer
Statistical Report 24-25 (1994). In 1991, only 8.6% of all practicing lawyers were
federal, state or local government employees, and only a fraction of this 8.6% were
employed as public defenders. See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard Revesz, Legal
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pay little attention to the development of the profession, its current
structure, or how the American profession compares to legal
professions in other countries.
Third, the traditional approach tends toward particularistic analysis:
a particular profession, a particular problem, and the application of a
particular rule. Though most casebooks provide an analytical
framework (for instance, the pros and cons of zealous advocacy), the
framework itself is not the focus of analysis and tends to be invoked
sporadically. Thus, whereas in most law classes we encourage the
development of an analytical framework, in professional
responsibility, we tend toward narrow lessons about the application of
particular rules. Perhaps in part for this reason, the traditional course
on professional responsibility tends to be boring and unpopular with
both students and faculty.19
Finally, the traditional course on professional responsibility, like the
Model Rules themselves,' focuses on lawyers' individual conduct and
Education and Entry into the Legal Profession: The Role of Race, Gender and
Educational Debt, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 829, 839 (1995) (citing Curran & Carson, supra,
at 24).
19. See Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Story and Commitment in the
Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 145, 146 (1996) (stating that "legal
ethics remains an unloved orphan of legal education," and that many law teachers
"remain convinced that the subject is unteachable"); David Luban & Michael
Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics
31, 37-38 (1995) (stating that "the legal ethics course is - not to put too fine a point on
it - the dog of the curriculum, despised by students, taught by overworked deans or
underpaid adjuncts and generally disregarded by the faculty at large"); Deborah L
Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. Legal Educ. 31, 40-41 (1992) (reviewing
students' critiques of law school ethics instruction); William H. Simon, The Trouble
With Legal Ethics, 41 J. Legal Educ. 65, 65 (1991) (noting that "[a]t most law schools,
students find the course in legal ethics or professional responsibility boring and
insubstantial, and faculty dread having to teach it").
20. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct are aimed entirely at individual
lawyers - at regulating the conduct of lawyers as individuals, rather than the practices
of work organizations such as law firms. It is true that some of the rules have
implications for law firm management, such as the rules prohibiting conflicts of
interest and the supervisory duties spelled out in Rule 5.1(a). See Model Rules, supra
note 8, R. 5.1 (a) (requiring partners in law firms to "make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all
lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct"). The Model Rules
also restrict the organizational forms in which lawyers may practice, by prohibiting
fee-sharing and non-lawyer partnerships. See Model Rules, supra note 8, R. 5.4. Yet,
while some of the rules have implications for law firms, none regulates them directly,
as entities, with their own set of professional responsibilities. See Schneyer,
Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, supra note 13, at 4 ("Disciplinary agencies
have always taken individual lawyers as their targets.... The traditional focus on
individuals has probably resulted from the system's jurisdictional tie to licensing,
which the state requires only for individuals, and from the system's development at a
time when solo practice was the norm."). To the extent that law firms have instituted
management practices designed to promote ethical and regulatory compliance, such
developments have been in response to other regulatory incentives (such as judicial
enforcement of Rule 11, judicial disqualification motions, administrative agency
enforcement, and the threat of civil malpractice). See Ted Schneyer, A Tale of Four
2000]
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makes the lawyer-as-individual the primary unit of analysis. Such an
approach is seriously at odds with the reality of modern law practice,
in which a majority of lawyers practice and are professionally
socialized within organizations. Moreover, by making the individual
the unit of analysis, the traditional approach leaves out a whole set of
"professional responsibilities" having to do with the stewardship of
the profession and its institutions and organizations.
II. THE SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH
The sociological approach avoids these problems and, I will argue,
makes the most of the subject. Rather than assuming the centrality of
professional discipline, it treats the role of professional discipline as an
empirical and theoretical question. Rather than implicitly providing a
distorted empirical picture of the profession, it makes the empirical
study of the profession a central feature of the course, and places the
American legal profession within a historic and cross-national context.
And rather than narrowing the scope of the course-and the concept
of "professional responsibility" - the sociological approach broadens
the subject by comparing the legal profession to other professions
within a theoretical framework. This section provides an overview of
the components of a "sociological" approach.
A. Theoretical Framework
The central theoretical question in the sociology of the professions
is the relationship between knowledge and power. There are two
classic theoretical positions, which can be labeled "functional" and
"conflict" theory. I spend the second day of class introducing these
positions and defining a conceptual shorthand ("K" for knowledge
and "P" for power) to which I return throughout the course.
Functional theory holds that knowledge comes first: that
professional power-i.e. monopoly over tasks and the right of self-
regulation-is justified and indeed necessitated by the "asymmetry of
expertise" between professional and client."1 Because clients do not
have sufficient knowledge to judge the quality of professional service,
Systems: Reflections on How Law Influences the "Ethical Infrastructure" of Law
Firms, 39 S. Tex. L. Rev. 245, 247-54 (1998) [hereinafter Schneyer, A Tale of Four
Systems] (discussing the "insignificance of professional discipline" in the development
of "ethical infrastructure" in law firms); Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?,
supra note 12, at 827-28, 832 (noting the role of judicial disqualification in prompting
the development of conflicts-avoidance systems within firms).
21. See generally A.M Carr-Saunders & P. A. Wilson, The Professions 36-55
(1933); Talcott Parsons, The Social System (1964); Talcott Parsons, The Professions
and Social Structure, in Essays in Sociological Theory 34-49 (2d ed. 1954). See also
Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Expert Division of
Labor 5, 15 (1988) (reviewing the functional explanation for professional monopoly
and self-regulation).
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they must be protected from incompetent practitioners through state
licensing requirements and professional self-regulation. In other
words, professional knowledge precedes and necessitates professional
power (or K-> P). The paradigmatic functionalist sociologist is Talcott
Parsons, who writes of the professions:
Among their basic characteristics is a level of special technical
competence that must be acquired through formal training and that
necessitates special mechanisms of social control in relation to the
recipients of services because of the "competence gap" which makes
it unlikely that the "layman" can properly evaluate the quality of
such services or the credentials of those who offer them. 2
This is the legal profession's own justification for its monopoly over
law practiceP and its right (and responsibility) of self-regulation. -4
22. Talcott Parsons, Equality and Inequality in Modern Society, or Social
Stratification Revisited, in Social Stratification: Class, Race, & Gender in Sociological
Perspective 670, 679 (David B. Grusky ed., 1994).
23. See, e.g., State v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 587, 595 (Fla. 1962) ("The reason for
prohibiting the practice of law by those who have not been examined and found
qualified to practice is frequently misunderstood. It is not done to aid or protect
members of the legal profession either in creating or maintaining a monopoly or
closed shop. It is done to protect the public from being advised and represented in
legal matters by unqualified persons over whom the judicial department can exercise
little, if any, control..."). See also Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1189
(Fla. 1978) (quoting Sperry); Charles Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics 828-34 (1986)
(explaining the justification for the enforcement of unauthorized practice legislation).
Lawyers have offered four justifications to explain the bar's fervor for
pursuing unauthorized practitioners: protecting clients against harmful
incompetence; protecting the legal system against the consequences of
incompetence or lack of integrity by nonlawyers; providing the necessary
framework for regulating lawyers; and, although rarely admitted, enhancing
the economic position of lawyers. Taken separately or together, the
arguments are strikingly problematical as justification for the wide sweep of
current unauthorized practice law. They also closely resemble arguments
that arborists, architects, cosmetologists, dentists, plumbers, and a host of
other occupational groups have made for costly monopolies in their areas of
business.
Id. at 829. Interestingly, almost all complaints of unauthorized practice come from
lawyers rather than clients. See Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional
Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice
Prohibitions, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 33 (1981).
24. The traditional goal of professional discipline is to protect the public from
incompetent and otherwise "unfit" practitioners. See, e.g., In re Echeles, 430 F.2d 347,
349 (7th Cir. 1970) (stating that the purpose of disciplinary proceedings is "to protect
the courts and the public from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice").
Bar leaders argue that disciplinary agencies are the most effective enforcement
authority because lawyers are uniquely qualified to determine whether an ethical
breach has occurred. See Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Law.vers?, supra note 12, at
812 (citing Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, American
Bar Ass'n, Problems and Recommendations in Disciplinary Enforcement 136-37
(1970)). See also McKay Report, supra note 12, at 5 (arguing that self-regulation is the
only enforcement system compatible with the separation of powers and lawyers'
status as independent professionals).
2000]
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Conflict theory challenges this explanation for professional power.
Conflict theory argues that power comes first: that traditionally
powerful members of society are able to convince others of their
special expertise and its societal importance, and thereby to secure
state support for monopoly and self-regulation. 25 (That is: P -4 K.)
Conflict theory argues that the "professions" are distinguished from
other occupations by their success in achieving market closure,26 not
by the objective technical or intellectual demands of their work:
Political power is involved in almost all successful professions;
they achieve their monopoly and self-governing rights by getting the
force of the state to license them and back up their collective
authority over members. 27
Many of the techniques by which the professions of today became
organized originally and achieved their high status were based on
mystification and secrecy regarding their real skills and use of their
status background rather than their technique per se. The elite
professions in America [i.e. medicine and law] grew out of older
gentry elites: their communal organization from upper-class clubs
and their legitimating ideology from the traditions of upper-class
altruism and religious leadership.28
This debate about the sources of (and justifications for) professional
power is part of a broader sociological debate about the functions of
social inequality, or "stratification," more generally. The functional
theory of stratification holds that some jobs (such as the professions)
are objectively more important to society than others; and that, in
order to adapt and survive, societies must insure a meritocratic
matching of individuals to jobs. To attract and motivate the most
25. See generally Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13; Randall Collins, The
Credential Society (1979); Eliot Friedson, Profession of Medicine: A Study of the
Sociology of Applied Knowledge (1970) [hereinafter Friedson, Profession of
Medicine]; Eliot Friedson, Professional Dominance (1970); Terence J. Johnson,
Professions and Power (1972); Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A
Sociological Analysis (1977).
26. See Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 40-141; Collins, supra note 25,
at 1-48; Larson, supra note 25, at 49-52.
27. Collins, supra note 25, at 133.
28. Id. at 135. Collins offers medicine as a primary example:
What is striking about the traditionally high status of medicine is the fact
that it was based on virtually no valid expertise at all. The training on which
physicians prided themselves consisted of ancient works like Galen,
containing physiological theories whose practical application were [sic] not
merely wrong but positively harmful. Prevailing theories of disease led to
practices such as bleeding and purging as major cures. The most renowned
physician of colonial America, the scholarly and genteel Philadelphian,
Benjamin Rush, promulgated a theory whose recommendations for all
ailments consisted of massive doses of enemas. In general, with the
exception of Jenner's smallpox vaccination developed in 1798, there were no
valid medical treatments at all until 1850.
Id. at 139 (footnotes omitted).
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capable people to perform the most important jobs, societies must
distribute rewards (such as income and status) unequally, with the
highest rewards reserved for the most important jobs.29 Functional
theory therefore argues that stratification is functional for society, that
is, that it contributes to the survival of society as a whole:
If the rights and perquisites of different positions in a society must
be unequal, then the society must be stratified, because that is
precisely what stratification means. Social inequality is thus an
unconsciously evolved device by which societies insure that the most
important positions are conscientiously filled by the most qualified
persons. Hence every society, no matter how simple or complex,
must differentiate persons in terms of both prestige and esteem, and
must therefore possess a certain amount of institutionalized
inequality.3'
Conflict theory emphasizes conflict between groups within society.
Conflict theory argues that the functional hierarchy of jobs is
ideologically constructed, and that even for jobs requiring special
training, there are more potentially qualified individuals than jobs.3'
Conflict theory therefore argues that stratification is (also)
dysfunctional for society, because it breeds resentment between
groups and artificially limits societies' productive capabilities:
Social stratification systems function to limit the possibility of
discovery of the full range of talent available in a society. This results
from the fact of unequal access to appropriate motivation, channels
of recruitment and centers of training.... Social stratification
systems function to provide the elite with the political power
necessary to procure acceptance and dominance of an ideology
which rationalizes the status quo, whatever it may be, as "logical,"
"natural" and "morally right."' 2
The obviously mixed character of the functions of social inequality
should come as no surprise to anyone. If sociology is sophisticated in
any sense, it is certainly with regard to its awareness of the mixed
nature of any social arrangement....
"Stratification" is an exceedingly easy concept to teach to law
students. What, I ask them, is the function of grades in law school?
What do grades measure? Does your theory depend on your grades?
Who benefits from the law school grading system? Students? Faculty?
Employers? Clients? What qualities are required to be a good lawyer?
What is the relationship between these qualities and law school
29. See Kingsley Davis & Wilbert E. Moore, Some Principles of Stratification, 10
Am. Soc. Rev. 242 (1945) (for the classic functional account).
30. Id. at 243.
31. See Melvin M. Tumin, Some Principles of Stratification: A Critical Analysis, 18
Am. Soc. Rev. 387 (1953).




grades? What is 'the relationship between these qualities and law
school admission criteria? What is the function of U.S. News and
World Report's annual ranking of law schools? Who benefits from this
ranking? And so on. Inevitably, students reproduce an extremely
sophisticated version of the functional-conflict debate and at least
some students make the argument that it is not all one way or the
other.
This is a good time to bring the discussion back to the relationship
between professional knowledge and professional power. Twain's
account is helpful here, because it acknowledges the importance of
both knowledge and power in the rise and fall of the riverboat pilots.
In describing "a pilot's needs,"' for example, Twain first emphasizes
the importance of memory:
One cannot easily realize what a tremendous thing it is to know
every trivial detail of twelve hundred miles of river and know it with
absolute exactness. 35
Give a man a tolerably fair memory to start with, and piloting will
develop it into a very colossus of capability.... Astonishing things
can be done with the human memory if you will devote it faithfully
to one particular line of business.36
Besides memory, Twain argues that pilots also need good judgment
and "pluck":
A pilot must have a memory; but there are two higher qualities
which he must also have. He must have good and quick judgment
and decision, and a cool, calm courage that no peril can shake. Give
a man the merest trifle of pluck to start with, and by the time he has
become a pilot he cannot be unmanned by any danger a steamboat
can get into; but one cannot quite say the same for judgment.
Judgment is a matter of brains, and a man must start with a good
stock of that article or he will never succeed as a pilot.37
Memory, judgment and pluck, however, are not the sole or most
immediate bases of pilots' professional success. In Twain's account,
pilots' success as a group stems from their strategy of professional
organization; that is, the formation of a closed association with control
over the training and supply of new entrants.
The association had a good bank account now and was very strong.
There was no longer an outsider. A by-law was added forbidding
the reception of any more cubs or apprentices for five years; after
which time a limited number would be taken, not by individuals, but
by the association, upon these terms: the applicant must not be less
34. Twain, supra note 1, at 107-17.
35. Id. at 107.
36. Id. at 109-10.
37. Id. at 113.
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than eighteen years old, and of respectable family and good
character; he must pass an examination as to education, pay a
thousand dollars in advance for the privilege of becoming an
apprentice, and must remain under the commands of the association
until a great part of the membership (more than half, I think) should
be willing to sign his application for a pilot's license.3
Twain's account thus illuminates the interactive nature of
knowledge and power (that is: K-P-) K--P-).. .), and shows how
both functional and conflict theory provide useful "frames" for
empirical analysis. One may start with knowledge (...K--4P-4K.. .) or
with power (...P->K->P...) without claiming that either is
independent of the other. Twain's account also provides an
opportunity to flesh out the theoretical framework of the course by
comparing the nature of pilots' knowledge and power to that of, say,
lawyers. What, for instance, is the difference between pilots'
knowledge and lawyers' knowledge? How easy is it for outsiders to
judge whether someone is a good pilot or lawyer? Who defines the
goals of piloting or lawyering? Why were the railroads a threat to the
pilots? Who are the main competitors for lawyers' work? Under what
conditions might we expect lawyers to lose their professional power?
What kinds of lawyers currently enjoy the most professional power
and why? What are the sources of stratification within the American
legal profession?
At this point, students begin to elucidate key theoretical issues in
the sociology of the professions, such as the importance of formal,
abstract knowledge 9 and interprofessional competition.' Students
38. Id. at 138-39.
39. See Abbott, supra note 21, at 52-58 (discussing the importance of abstract
knowledge in professional claims for exclusive jurisdiction over tasks); Friedson,
Profession of Medicine, supra note 25, at 1-16 (defining "professionals" as agents of
formal knowledge). As one commentator states:
It is clear that not all occupations can become professions in the strong sense
of the term.... Special conditions are necessary. A strong profession
requires a real technical skill that produces demonstrable results and can be
taught. Only thus can the skill be monopolized, by controlling who will be
trained. The skill must be difficult enough to require training and reliable
enough to produce results. But it cannot be too reliable, for then outsiders
can judge work by its results and control its practitioners by their judgments.
The ideal profession has a skill that occupies the mid-point of a continuum
between complete predictability and complete unpredictability of results. At
one end are skills like those of plumbers and mechanics, which do not give
rise to strong professions because outsiders can judge whether the job is well
done; supervisors know whether the machinery runs or not, although they
may not know why. At the other end are vague skills like administrative
politicking or palm reading; these cannot be monopolized because they are
too unreliable or idiosyncratic for some to successfully train others in them.
See Collins, supra note 25, at 132-33 (citations omitted).
40. Recent sociological literature on the professions has moved away from the
field's initial focus on case studies of single professions and begun to focus instead on
the task-based "jurisdictions" over which professions compete. According to Abbott:
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also begin to focus on the many divisions within the legal profession
and the implications of these divisions for self-regulation. With this
theoretical framework in place, I begin the first main section of the
course: the empirical study of the American legal profession.
B. The History and Structure of the American Legal Profession
This section of the course has two pedagogical aims: to show how
the American legal profession secured its professional monopoly, and
to give students an empirical overview of the current structure of the
profession. Both aims are best accomplished through the use of a
comparative framework; that is, through comparisons to other
professions, and to legal professions in other countries.
In my own presentation, I draw heavily on sociologists and
historians of the legal profession, such as Richard Abel, Lawrence
Friedman, and Willard Hurst, and sociologists of the professions
generally, such as Andrew Abbott and Randall Collins. As a group,
these authors provide a detailed case study of the American
profession's development as well as rich comparative data about legal
professions in other countries (particularly Britain). I focus especially
on the emergence of law schools and their impact on the profession's
development; the emergence and impact of the large law firm as an
organizational form; sources of competition for lawyers' work; and
sources of stratification within the profession. One could rely on other
sources, however, and emphasize different aspects of the profession's
history and structure, without compromising the basic goal of this
section of the course. The key is to locate the American legal
profession within a historic and comparative framework and, in doing
so, to make students aware that the American profession is a
particular case - just one example - of professional development.
1. The Development of Lawyers' Monopoly
The foundation of a professional monopoly is control over the
supply and training of new members.4 Once entry barriers are
The professions... make up an interdependent system. In this system, each
profession has its activities under various kinds of jurisdiction. Sometimes it
has full control, sometimes control subordinate to another group.
Jurisdictional boundaries are perpetually in dispute, both in local practice
and in national claims. It is the history of jurisdictional disputes that is the
real, the determining history of the professions. Jurisdictional claims furnish
the impetus and the pattern to organizational developments. Thus an
effective historical sociology of professions must begin with case studies of
jurisdictions and jurisdiction disputes.
See Abbott, supra note 21, at 2.
41. See Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 26 (identifying restrictions on
entry as "the foundation of market control"); Harold L. Wilensky, The
Professionalization of Everyone?, 70 Am. J. Soc. 137, 142-46 (1964) (describing the
ideal typical stages of professionalization).
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established, the profession can profitably turn its attention to
restricting competition from outsiders; that is, to protecting and
expanding its jurisdiction over certain types of work.42
a. Control over Supply and Training
Students generally are surprised to learn that American lawyers'
monopoly is relatively recent, having been established (as we know it)
only in the mid-twentieth century.43 Though lawyers in colonial
America, many of whom were trained in London, retained the status
and organization of the British profession (including the division
between barristers and solicitors),'M the Revolutionary war severely
disrupted colonial lawyers' nascent professional development," and
ushered in an era of egalitarian sentiment that proved hostile to state-
supported monopolies. 6 After the war, most jurisdictions significantly
relaxed the apprenticeship requirement (then the only requirement
for admission to the bar),4 7 and colonial bar associations, having lost
their de facto control over admission, eventually "crumbled and
disappeared."' Control over admission to practice devolved to local
courts with little centralization or policing of standards.4 9 Bar
examinations were typically "oral and administered in a very casual
42. See Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 112 (arguing that these two
components of professional monopoly are "necessarily sequential"). Additionally,
Abel argues that "[m]embers of an occupational category within the division of labor
first must control entry.... Only when social closure is well advanced can a
profession turn to the second element: restricting competition." Id. at 123.
43. See Abbott, supra note 21, at 247.
44. See Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 40 (Colonial lawyers "retained
their links to England, preserving the division between barristers and solicitors by
sending some students to the Inns of Court in London to prepare for call to the
English Bar."); Collins, supra note 25, at 148-49 (stating that "[t]he practice of law...
in the prerevolutionary period was virtually monopolized by the upper class of
wealthy merchants and planters, who did their best to emulate the English pattern of
the closed legal caste"); James Willard Hurst, The Growth of American Law. The
Law Makers 253 (1950) (noting the adoption of the barrister-solicitor distinction in
prerevolutionary America).
45. Many of the most prominent practitioners were British sympathizers who
emigrated to England to escape wartime persecution of Tories. See Abel, American
Lawyers, supra note 13, at 40; Collins, supra note 25, at 149.
46. See Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 40; Collins, supra note 25, at
149; Hurst, supra note 44, at 251,267, 275-77.
47. In 1800, 14 out of 19 jurisdictions required lawyers to complete an
apprenticeship, typically lasting five years (the length required of English solicitors).
By 1840, only 11 out of 30 jurisdictions required apprenticeship, and by 1860, only 9
out of 39 jurisdictions required it. See Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 40-
41; Collins, supra note 25, at 150. See also Robert Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The
American Law School, in Law in American History 403, 412-13 (Donald Fleming &
Bernard Bailyn, eds., 1971).
48. Collins, supra note 25, at 149; see also Hurst, supra note 44, at 285.
49. Collins, supra note 25, at 149; see also Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13,
at 71; Hurst, supra note 44, at 279-82.
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fashion."5 Between the American Revolution and the Civil War,
therefore, "virtually any white male could become a lawyer."'5' The
following story is illustrative:
L.E. Chittenden, in Vermont in the 1850s, was chairman of the
committee to examine candidates for admission. Two young men
came before him: "Of any branch of the law, they were as ignorant
as so many Hottentots.... I frankly told them that for them to
attempt to practice law would be wicked, dangerous, and would
subject them to suits for malpractice. They begged, they prayed,
they cried." Anyway, they wanted to go west: "I, with much self-
reproach, consented to sign their certificates, on the condition that
each would buy a copy of Blackstone, Kent's Commentaries, and
Chitty's Pleadings, and immediately emigrate to some Western
town.
, 52
After the Civil War, several developments led to tightened control
over entry. First, the nature of legal work changed with the emergence
and growth of corporations, and a nationally prominent group of
business lawyers began to develop and organize. 3 These elite lawyers
formed bar associations made up of the "decent part"'  of the bar,
with the aim of raising standards for admission and policing the
activities of non-elite lawyers involved in local political machines. 5 In
1878, the American Bar Association was founded in Saratoga, New
York by a group of wealthy business lawyers who vacationed at
50. Collins, supra note 25, at 149; see also Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of
American Law 652-53 (2d ed. 1985) (describing the perfunctory nature of bar
admission in the late 1850s); Hurst, supra note 44, at 281-84 (same).
51. Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 71.
52. Friedman, supra note 50, at 653 (quoting L.E. Chittenden, Legal
Reminiscences, 5 Green Bag 307, 309 (1893)).
53. Before the Civil War, most legal work concerned land and commerce,
"especially representing speculative interests in the West." Collins, supra note 25, at
151. After the Civil War, lawyers became increasingly involved in representing
corporations and banks. Id.; see also Abbott, supra note 21, at 248-49 (discussing the
expansion of legal work resulting from the emergence of the corporate form and
administrative bureaucracies); Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Coming of Big Business,
in The Comparative Approach to American History 220,223-34 (C. Vann Woodward
ed., 1968) (discussing the development of new industry in the late 1800s). Elite
business lawyers tended to be active in social, political and law reform efforts. See
Robert W. Gordon, The Ideal and the Actual in the Law: Fantasies and Practices of
New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in The New High Priests: Lawyers in Post-Civil
War America 51, 67 n.6 (G. Gawalt ed., 1984).
54. Friedman, supra note 50, at 652. The self-proclaimed "decent part" of the bar
consisted of "well-to-do business lawyers, predominantly of old-American stock." Id.
at 648.
55. Between 1870 and 1878, sixteen city and state bar associations were
established, including New York City (1870), Cleveland (1873), Chicago (1874), Iowa
(1874), St. Louis (1874), and Boston (1877). Almost all had a reform ideology, aimed
at combating political corruption, raising the standards for admission to practice, and
improving the image of the profession. See Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at
44-45; Friedman, supra note 50, at 648-52; Hurst, supra note 44, at 286; Stevens, supra
note 47, at 456.
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Saratoga Springs.56 Upon its founding, the ABA established a
Committee on Legal Education to promote stricter educational
requirements for admission to the profession.'
Around the same time, university law professors began to promote
the "scientific" study of law"8 and law schools began to proliferate. 59
Before the Civil War, there were few incentives to pursue a formal
legal education. No state required a law degree (or college degree) for
admission to the bar,' and formal preparation was unnecessary to
pass most bar examinations.61 In 1860, there were only twenty-one
law schools in the entire country,6 most offering informal, short
courses based on lectures by notable practitioners, with no attendance
requirement and minimal educational standards.63 Even after the war,
office apprenticeship remained the primary method for legal training.
As late as 1891, 80% of lawyers entered practice without attending
any law school.'
Well past 1850, the chief method of legal education was the
apprenticeship: The student read law in an older lawyer's office; he
did much of the hand copying of legal instruments that had to be
done before the day of the typewriter; and he did many small
services in and about the office, including service of process.
Sometimes the older man might take these incidental services as his
pay for his preceptorship. But stiff fees were paid for the privilege of
reading in the office of many a leader of the bar. Legal biography
amply witnesses that such training was of widely varying
thoroughness and quality; that it was typically not of great length of
time; and that much of it, as in the interminable copying of
documents, was of a rote character. 6
After the Civil War, however, there began a revolution in legal
education. In 1870, Christopher Columbus Langdell was appointed
Dean of Harvard Law School, where he introduced the "case method"
that defines law teaching today.' The case method is based on the
56. See Collins, supra note 25, at 153; Friedman, supra note 50, at 650; Hurst,
supra note 44, at 287.
57. See Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 46.
58. See Collins, supra note 25, at 152; Hurst, supra note 44, at 261-62.
59. See Robert B. Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the
1850s to the 1980s 74-75 (1983); see also Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at
41,277 (noting the establishment of part time programs).
60. Friedman, supra note 50, at 606.
61. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
62. Friedman, supra note 50, at 607.
63. Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 41; Collins, supra note 25, at 150.
64. See Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 41 (citing ABA Committee on
Legal Education, Report 318 (1891)).
65. Hurst, supra note 44, at 256.
66. Collins, supra note 25, at 152; Friedman, supra note 50, at 408-09; Hurst, supra
note 44, at 261-65; see also Joel Seligman, Laying the Foundations: The Law School
Model of Christopher Columbus Langdell, in The High Citadel: The Influence of
Harvard Law School 20,20-46 (1978).
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view that law is a science, built on a small number of fundamental
principles that are best learned inductively through close study of
selected judicial opinions.67 As Langdell wrote in the preface to his
classic casebook on the law of contracts:
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or
doctrines. To have such a mastery of these as to be able to apply
them with constant facility and certainty to the evertangled skein of
human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer; and hence to
acquire that mastery should be the business of every earnest student
of law. Each of these doctrines has arrived at its present state by
slow degrees; in other words, it is a growth, extending in many cases
through centuries. This growth is to be traced in the main through a
series of cases; and much the shortest and best, if not the only way of
mastering the doctrine effectually is by studying the cases in which it
is embodied.68
Langdell also introduced the hiring of full-time instructors whose
careers were devoted to scholarship (versus practice), 69 and annual
written exams to determine students' eligibility for further study.7" In
1896, Harvard became the first law school to require a college degree
as a prerequisite for law school admission.71
The 'Harvard model' of legal education initially was slow to catch
on, and did not become firmly established outside of Ivy League
universities until well after 1900.72 Its primary competition as an
educational model came from part-time night schools that catered to
working students.73 In contrast to full-time "day" schools such as
Harvard, which emphasized fundamental legal doctrine, the night
schools emphasized practical training and the particulars of local law.74
Between 1890 and 1900, the number of night schools grew from nine
to twenty,75 and their combined enrollment increased from 1027 to
3477 students. 76 By 1920, the number of students enrolled in part-time
67. See Friedman, supra note 50, at 613-14.
68. Hurst, supra note 44, at 262, quoting Christopher C. Langdell, Selection of
Cases on the Law of Contracts (1871). Langdell did not invent the case method, but
was the first to make it the foundation of the law school curriculum. Id. at 261.
69. Friedman, supra note 50, at 609 (crediting Langdell with introducing the
practice of hiring full-time law teachers); Hurst, supra note 44, at 264 (discussing the
appointment of James Barr Ames to the Harvard law faculty).
70. Hurst, supra note 44, at 263 (discussing Langdell's introduction of year-end
written exams).
71. Collins, supra note 25, at 152.
72. Id.
73. See Stevens, supra note 59, at 74-76.
74. See Friedman, supra note 50, at 619 (discussing the "striking cleavage"
between part-time night schools and full-time day schools); Hurst, supra note 44, at
273 (same).
75. Friedman, supra note 50, at 619.
76. Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 254.
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programs (11,982) exceeded the number enrolled in full-time schools(11,764).-n
The Harvard model nevertheless appealed to bar leaders who were
attempting to tighten control over entry into the profession. Elite
lawyers, especially in the East, began to push for law school training
as a requirement for bar admission, and to push law schools
themselves to raise their educational prerequisites.78 In 1896, only 7
out of 76 law schools required a high school diploma for admission; by
1903, 51 out of 104 law schools required it.79 Following Harvard, many
full-time schools also began to require at least two years of college.'
In 1900, the ABA Section on Legal Education organized the
American Association of Law Schools as an accrediting association,
and in 1923, the ABA began to publish law school ratings based on
conformity with the Harvard model."
The ABA's efforts to increase educational requirements initially
were hampered by law schools' competition for students, and states'
reluctance to make law school attendance a prerequisite for bar
admission.'s In 1890, only 50% of states required any definite period
of legal study for admission to the bar, and as late as 1936, only six
states required study in an ABA-approved law school.' Nevertheless,
there was a growing market for law school training, which in many
states was more accessible-and cheaper-than office
apprenticeship.' Between 1890 and 1914, most state licensing
authorities had created centralized boards of bar examiners, and
introduced written bar exams patterned after law school exams.' 6
Moreover, many degree-conferring schools offered their graduates
automatic admission to the bar (known as "diploma privilege"). 7 By
77. Id.
78. See Collins, supra note 25, at 154-55 (discussing the tension between upper-
class lawyers in the East, who favored exclusionary policies, and rural and ethnic
minority lawyers, who resisted the imposition of such policies).
79. Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 48.
80. Id.
81. Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 46-47; Collins, supra note 25, at
154-55 (discussing the battle against "unqualified" schools).
82. See Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 48, 54 (discussing changes in
law school admissions requirements between 1890 and 1950).
83. See Collins, supra note 25, at 155; Hurst, supra note 44, at 272-73; see also
Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 49, 51-53 (discussing changes in state
requirements for admission to the profession).
84. Collins, supra note 25, at 155.
85. See Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 43; William R. Johnson,
Schooled Lawyers: A Study in the Clash of Professional Cultures 56, 71-72, 81, 86, 95,
100 (1978) (discussing the advantages of law school training over apprenticeship
during this period).
86. See Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 43 (noting that law schools
were perceived to offer better bar exam preparation than apprenticeships); Collins,
supra note 25, at 154 (noting that bar exams were written and graded by lawyers with
close ties to leading schools).
87. Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 62.
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1910, law school attendance had displaced apprenticeship as the
primary method of preparing for the bar," and by the late 1930s,
ABA-approved law schools had captured the market for legal
education.89
The transformation from apprenticeship to law school had
profound consequences for the profession. 90 The rapid proliferation of
law schools and their initially minimal entry requirements significantly
expanded entry opportunities between 1900 and 1930.91 Though
apprenticeship requirements had been relatively lax, many lawyers did
not accept apprentices and some states limited the number of
apprentices that a lawyer could supervise. 2 Further, law school
training was available to immigrants and members of the working
class, who "were not likely to be welcomed as apprentices by lawyers
of different class, ethnicity, religion, and culture." 93 Although
immigrants and working class students were concentrated in the
"unapproved" schools, states were slow to require attendance at ABA
approved schools, and until the late 1930s, the unapproved schools
enrolled a significant percentage of all law students.94 Somewhat
paradoxically, then, the campaign by the "decent part" of the bar to
raise educational standards-which had been tied to efforts to prevent
"overcrowding" by non-elite lawyers (especially immigrants and
Jews)g5-created a market for legal education that initially could not be
tightly controlled. 96
Theoretically, the inability to control entry makes for a weak
profession, and compared to American doctors during the same
historical period, American lawyers were relatively weak. 97 As it turns
88. See Hurst, supra note 44, at 272; see also Abel, American Lawyers, supra note
13, at 41-42 (noting that the speed and timing of the transformation varied somewhat
by city and state).
89. See Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 54-58. In 1935, enrollment in
ABA-approved law schools (19,824) for the first time exceeded enrollment in
unapproved schools (17,498). By 1938, ABA-approved schools enrolled 68% of all
law students, and by 1948, they enrolled 82 percent. Id. at 254.
90. See id. at 42 (stating that "[tihe importance of this transformation cannot be
exaggerated").
91. Id. at 43. By 1900, there were 102 degree-conferring law schools in the United
States (up from 21 in 1860). In 1920, there were 146, and in 1940, there were 190. See
Hurst, supra note 44, at 272.
92. See Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 43.
93. Id. at 43.
94. At their high point in 1928, there were over 31,000 students enrolled in
unapproved schools, compared to 15,000 students enrolled in ABA-approved schools.
See id. at 277-78.
95. See id. at 47, 85-87; Collins, supra note 25, at 155-56.
96. See Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 71-73; Collins, supra note 25, at
156-57; see also Stevens, supra note 59, at 73-84 (discussing the explosion in the
number of law schools at the turn of the century).
97. See Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 55; Collins, supra note 25, at
142-47; see also Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine 79-144
(1982).
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out, however, the move to law school as the primary method of
training laid the foundation for the future strength of the American
legal profession. The bar's initial inability to impose prerequisites for
law school admission resulted in a timely, dramatic growth in the
number of lawyers. Between 1880 and 1920, the number of lawyers in
the United States doubled from 60,626 to 122,519.1 By 1930, the
number of lawyers grew to over 160,000. 9 As a result, American
lawyers were poised to capture the expanding market for legal
services created by the rise of corporations and the emergence of the
administrative state."°
The creation of a vertically integrated (if highly stratified)
educational system also has contributed significantly to the creation
and maintenance of a "unified" profession. 10 1 Contrary to Britain, for
instance, which maintains the division between barristers and
solicitors," 2 and most civil law countries, which recognize multiple
legal specialties with separate training and admission requirements,' °3
the American legal profession is formally unified despite the wide
variety of jobs and career paths available to lawyers, and despite the
informal status distinctions between lawyers educated at different
schools. 104 This characteristic of American lawyers has made them a
9& Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 280.
99. 1&
100. See Abbott, supra note 21, at 247-54, 275-79 (comparing American lawyers to
British solicitors).
101. See Collins, supra note 25, at 159. This vertical integration is characteristic of
the educational system in the United States generally. As Collins writes:
Where the European type of branching into specialized training produces
distinctive types of careers at early choice points (e.g., medical or legal
training are entered directly at the end of secondary school), the U.S. system
continually puts off final professional identification to the very end of the
sequence.... In brief, the contrast is between a system in which elite
occupational access is marked off early by horizontal branchings and one in
which there is a continuous set of vertical ranks, formally accessible to
everyone with sufficient perseverance....
Id at 91-92.
102. For a historical sociology of barristers and solicitors, including the
development of entry requirements, governance structures and current demographics,
see generally Richard L. Abel, The Legal Profession in England and Wales (1988).
103. See generally Lawyers in Society: The Civil Law World (Richard L Abel &
Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1988) (covering the structure and organization of legal
professions in Norway, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands. Belgium, France, Geneva,
Italy, Spain, Venezuela, and Brazil).
The civil law world is dramatically different from its common law
counterpoint in every respect. To begin with, there is no -legal profession."
Indeed the very title of this chapter is an ethnocentric misnomer. The
common law folk concept of "lawyer" has no counterpart in European
languages....
Richard L. Abel, Lawyers in the Civil Law World, in Lawyers in Society: The Civil
Law World, supra, at 4.
104. See Hurst, supra note 44, at 293 (noting that legal education furnished -the
most consistent thread of unity among lawyers").
2000]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
powerful lobbying force in their efforts to secure state protection from
occupational competition. 05
b. Jurisdiction Over Work
This brings us to the second step in securing a professional
monopoly: securing the profession's jurisdiction (P) over certain
types of work (K). Before the Civil War, American lawyers were
concerned primarily with establishing their exclusive rights to
advocacy in the courts.1"6 Their primary competitors in this contest
were lay representatives and court personnel, such as clerks.1°7 After
the war, the profession fought to define its monopoly more broadly, to
include nonlitigation activities such as will drafting, conveyancing, title
transfers, debt collection, and tax consulting, as well as the all-purpose
(and ill-defined) business of "giving legal advice."'" Lawyers' primary
competitors in these contests were other professionals, such as
bankers and accountants, as well as corporations, such as title
companies, mortgage companies, insurance companies, and collection
agencies.109
Lawyers relied on a variety of strategies in these jurisdictional
battles, the most important being state-by-state campaigns for
protective legislation."' Early efforts to stave off competition met
with populist opposition, however, and many were unsuccessful. In a
number of states, nonlawyers were permitted to represent parties in
litigation until as late as the 1930s."' Other states, such as California,
limited lawyers' monopoly to the courts, and explicitly permitted
laypersons to perform all other legal functions.'12 As a result, a
105. See Abel, Lawyers in the Civil Law World, supra note 103, at 22-24 (noting
that the relative unity of the U.S. profession contributes to lawyers' control over the
market for legal services).
106. See Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 112. Historically, such
advocacy is the core of Anglo-American lawyers' jurisdiction: in England, the first
professional lawyers emerged in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries as specialists in
the king's court, and gradually came to monopolize pleading before the royal judges.
See Carr-Saunders & Wilson, supra note 21, at 37-55; Collins, supra note 25, at 147.
107. See Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 112.
108. Id. at 113; see also Abbott, supra note 21, at 259; Hurst, supra note 44, at 320-
21; Wolfram, supra note 23, at 825.
109. See Abbott, supra note 21, at 265; Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at
112.
110. See Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 113. Between 1870 and 1920,
seventeen laws were passed protecting lawyers' exclusive rights to various types of
work. Id
111. Laypersons were allowed to represent parties in some California courts until
1933. See id. Until 1933, the Indiana constitution allowed any person to practice law in
the state courts, whether admitted by the courts or not. See Wolfram, supra note 23, at
824. Until 1930, any person could represent parties in Massachusetts courts as long as
they had a written power of attorney. Id. at 825 n.4 (citing E. Griswold, Law and
Lawyers in the United States 15-16 (1965)).
112. See Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 113 (discussing California's
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"vigorous and expansive doctrine of unauthorized practice" did not
take hold in most jurisdictions until well after World War .3
The profession's initial efforts to secure state protection were
hindered in part by a lack of reliable information about the sources
and extent of competition, and by the absence of an authoritative
definition of "the practice of the law."' 4 By the 1920s, however, the
ABA had become seriously concerned about nonlawyer competition,
and in 1930, it launched a national campaign against unauthorized
practice." The ABA also formed a committee on unauthorized
practice and urged state and local bar associations to follow suit." 6 It
published a newsletter to help coordinate state and local efforts, and
published articles on unauthorized practice in the American Bar
Association Journal."7 By 1940, 400 state and local bar associations
had formed unauthorized practice committees."" These committees
"hound[ed] alleged unauthorized practitioners with a zeal and sense
of purpose... not often matched by bar disciplinary committees in
their attempts to control wayward lawyers." 9
The campaign paid off, and in the 1930s, lawyers began to win
protection from the courts, which announced "sweeping common-law
doctrines of exclusive lawyer competence" in cases brought by bar
associations against nonlawyer competitors.12u Law yers also
negotiated a series of favorable interprofessional treaties that defined
broad areas of practice as off-limits to would-be competitors, such as
collection agencies (1937), claims adjusters (1939), law book
publishers (1941), banks (1941), realtors (1942), accountants (1951)
and social workers (1964).21 By the 1960s, American lawyers enjoyed
a more expansive monopoly than any other legal profession in the
world. 2
What accounts for American lawyers' success in securing such an
expansive monopoly? Part of the answer, as noted above, is the move
from apprenticeship to law school training. The supply of lawyers in
the United States expanded-and was capable of expanding-at
strong populist tradition and its effect on lawyers' efforts to regulate unauthorized
practice).
113. Wolfram, supra note 23, at 825.
114. See Hurst, supra note 44, at 320-21.
115. See Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 113; see also Abbott, supra
note 21, at 255 (chronicling the ABA campaign).
116. See Wolfram, supra note 23, at 825.
117. Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 113.
118. Id.
119. Wolfram, supra note 23, at 825.
120. Id. at 825-26.
121. Id. at 826.
122- See Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 113. Only in America have
lawyers secured a monopoly over the giving of legal advice. See Richard L Abel,
United States: The Contradictions of Professionalism, in Lawyers in Society: The
Common Law World 186,206 (Richard L. Abel and Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1988).
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precisely the right time to capture emerging markets for "legal"
work.1" This characteristic distinguishes American lawyers from
British solicitors, for example. Although the growth of corporations
and the rise of the administrative state occurred in Britain at about
the same time that it occurred in the United States, solicitors at the
time were required to undergo five years of clerkship under an
articled solicitor, and therefore were locked into a "rigid demographic
structure" that left them unable to respond to the sudden increase in
demand.124 Thus while British solicitors at the turn of the century
enjoyed far more professional power than American lawyers, by 1950
American lawyers had "clearly surpassed" their British
counterparts.125
Another part of the answer is the size and market orientation of the
American private bar. The proportion of lawyers in private practice is
larger in the United States than in most other countries, with the
exception of Great Britain. 126 Further, historically United States
private practitioners enjoyed less monopoly protection than private
practitioners elsewhere, and therefore had to compete more for
business. In civil law countries, the state historically controlled the
number of private practitioners through the use of admissions quotas,
and private practitioners in some countries continue to be so
protected.127 In 1966, British solicitors derived half their income from
their lucrative monopoly over conveyancing (transfer of real
property). 128 American private practitioners, by contrast, had to fight
for state protection in an era of populist sentiment and rapid entry
into the profession and, as many have noted (usually with regret),
have embraced the demands of market competition. 129
123. See Abbott, supra note 21, at 251-52.
124. Id. at 249, 251-53, 275-76. The length of "articles" has since been reduced to
two years for law graduates. The number of students with law degrees has increased
substantially, however, which has intensified competition for articles. See Richard L.
Abel, England and Wales: A Comparison of the Professional Projects of Barristers and
Solicitors, in Lawyers in Society: The Common Law World 23-75,31 (Richard L. Abel
and Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1988) (describing changes in the entry requirements for
solicitors since World War II).
125. Abbott, supra note 21, at 247 (contrasting solicitors' isolation with American
lawyers* "intense involvement" in both business and government).
126. See Abel, Lawyers in the Civil Law World, supra note 103, at 4-6, 10-11, 44-45
(comparing the number and proportion of lawyers in private practice in different
countries).
127. Id. at 10-11 (discussing the history of admissions quotas in Germany, Italy and
France). Some civil law countries in the 1950s and 1960s prohibited private
practitioners from accepting any form of employment or engaging in business
activities, and many civil law countries continue to impose significant restrictions on
lawyer advertising. Id. at 25-27 (discussing restrictions on competition among private
practitioners in Germany, Italy, France, and Denmark).
128. See Abel, The Legal Profession in England and Wales, supra note 102, at 219
(reporting solicitors' incomes from different types of work).
129. See Mary Ann Glendon, A Nation Under Lawyers: How the Crisis in the
Legal Profession is Transforming American Society 69-71 (1994) (discussing the
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Finally, part of American lawyers' success in securing an expansive
professional monopoly must be credited to the emergence and growth
of large law firms in the United States. 3 In response to the increasing
demand for corporate legal services, American business lawyers
moved relatively early to a bureaucratic organizational form.'3 ' This
form, which relies on internal hierarchy, specialization and economies
of scale, helped American lawyers maximize individual productivity
during a period when demand was outpacing supply:
As a social form for organizing the delivery of comprehensive,
continuous, high-quality legal services, especially to businesses, the
large law firm is unsurpassed.... Like the hospital as a way to
practice medicine, the big firm has provided the standard format for
delivering complex legal services. Even as the big firm is criticized,
features of its style-specialization, teamwork, continuous
monitoring on behalf of clients, representation in many forums-
have been emulated in other vehicles for delivering legal services.
The specialized boutique firm, the public-interest law firm, the
corporate law department-all model themselves on a style of
practice developed in the large firm. And legal professions around
the world have increasingly emulated the American big firm,
especially in breadth of legal services.1-
c. Current Contests
I conclude my discussion of the development of American lawyers'
monopoly by focusing on current jurisdictional contests between
increasing commercialization of law practice); Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost
Lawyer. Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession 294-300 (1993) (discussing large firm
lawyers' preoccupation with moneymaking); Sol M. Linowitz, The Betrayed
Profession: Lawyering at the End of the Twentieth Century 31-46 (1994) (discussing
the vices of the "marketing" approach in law firms); Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a
Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical
Profession, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 871, 896-906 (1999) (discussing lawyers' preoccupation
with money); Carroll Seron, The Business of Practicing Law: The Work Lives of Solo
and Small Firm Attorneys 1-18 (1996) (discussing the tension between
professionalism and commercialism).
130. See Abbott, supra note 21, at 252.
131. See Abel, Lawyers in the Civil Law World, supra note 103, at 39-40; Abel,
United States: The Contradictions of Professionalism, supra note 122, at 229 (stating
that "[ljarge law firms are a uniquely American phenonmenon"); Marc S. Galanter &
Thomas M. Palay, Large Law Firm Misery: It's the Tournament, Not the Money, 52
Vand. L. Rev. 953, 956 (1999) [hereinafter Galanter & Palay, Large Law Firm Misery]
(discussing the emergence of the large law firm in the United States).
132. Galanter & Palay, Large Law Firm Misery, supra note 131, at 956; see also
Abbott, supra note 21, at 252, 276; Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 199-
202; Robert L. Nelson, Partners with Power: The Social Transformation of the Large
Law Firm 26 (1988) (discussing specialization at large law firms); Marc S. Galanter &
Thomas M. Palay, Why the Big Get Bigger: The Promotion-to-Partner Tournament
and the Growth of Large Law Finns, 76 Va. L. Rev. 747, 756-65 (1990) [hereinafter
Galanter & Palay, Why the Big Get Bigger] (providing statistical analysis of the
growth of large corporate law firms).
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lawyers and their competitors. My goal is to show how jurisdictional
contests continue to shape the profession's development and how the
outcomes of such contests affect the boundaries between professions.
In recent years, I have focused particularly on the competition
between lawyers and accountants and the related debate about
multidisciplinary practice, and on the profession's efforts to regulate
self-help and internet providers. Exploring these issues requires
students to apply functional and conflict theory to current regulatory
problems, and to critically analyze the scope and content of the
current Model Rules.
The emergence of multidisciplinary practice, for instance, raises a
host of ethical and regulatory issues covered by the Model Rules,
including professional independence, 33 unauthorized practice, 13
confidentiality, 135 conflicts of interest,136 and the regulation of ancillary
133. See Model Rules, supra note 8, R. 5.4 (prohibiting a lawyer or law firm from
sharing fees with a nonlawyer or forming a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the
activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law). Protecting lawyers'
professional independence is the chief rationale behind Rule 5.4 and a chief concern
of opponents of multidisciplinary partnerships (MDPs). See, e.g., Edward S. Adams &
John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board?: A Proposal for Nonlawyer
Investment in Law Firms, 86 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 8-11 (1998) (reviewing the history of Rule
5.4 and its relationship to the MDP debate); Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men
Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of Purchasing Legal Services from Lawyers in a
Multidisciplinary Partnership, 13 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 217, 240-47 (2000) (discussing
the ABA's long-standing prohibitions against fee-sharing and partnerships between
lawyers and non-lawyers); New York State Bar Ass'n Special Comm. on the Law
Governing Firm Structure and Operation, Preserving the Core Values of the
American Legal Profession 324 (April 2000) [hereinafter MacCrate Report] (arguing
that "[u]nrestricted multidisciplinary practice would pose a substantial threat to the
roles and independence of the bar."). See also American Bar Ass'n Comm. on
Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to House of Delegates, Recommendation 1 at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpfinalrep2OOO.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2000)
[hereinafter ABA MDP Commission Report] (urging amendment of Rule 5.4 to
allow MDPs as long as lawyers retain "control and authority" over legal work).
134. See MacCrate Report, supra note 133, at 366-67 (urging the New York State
Attorney General to execute prohibitions against the unauthorized practice of law by
accountants); Daly, supra note 133, at 250-61 (discussing the "seeming impossibility"
of defining the "practice of law" and distinguishing it from the "practice of tax" by
accountants).
135. Lawyers and accountants have different and in some cases conflicting
disclosure requirements. For instance, a lawyer's duty to maintain client confidences
is incompatible with an auditor's duty to disclose all facts that would be material to
the audit. Compare Model Rules, supra note 8, R. 1.6, with Code of Professional
Conduct of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Rule 101
[hereinafter AICPA Code]. The SEC has taken the position that the role of auditors
and attorneys are incompatible under Federal Securities Law, and that
multidisciplinary partnerships between lawyers and accountants threaten auditor
independence. See SEC Commissioner Norman Johnson Has Grave Reservations
About MDPs, BCD News & Comment, Apr. 19, 2000.
136. The rules prohibiting conflicts of interest are stricter for lawyers than for
accountants. Compare Model Rules, supra note 8, Rules 1.7-1.10, with AICPA Code,
supra note 135, Rule 102-2. According to Larry Fox of Drinker Biddle & Reath in
Philadelphia:
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business.'37 It also highlights professional responsibilities not covered
by the Model Rules, such as the responsibilities of law firm managers
to create firm-level ethics controls, and the responsibility of the
profession to regulate law firms' ethical infrastructure.13s Likewise, the
regulation of self-help legal software and online legal services requires
an analysis of the Model Rules governing competenceu 39 diligence,"9
confidentiality,' and solicitation, 4 2 as well as issues not directly (or
What we're really fighting about [in the MDP debate] is whether our rules
governing conflicts of interest will survive.... Accounting firms got to be as
big as they are because they don't impute conflicts.... Every morning, an
accounting person gets up and he only has to worry about the clients he's
working for-no one else's. They have a subjective standard. The person
only has to look in the mirror and say, "How do I feel about it?" If I feel
okay, fine. Nobody comes along and judges them and says, "It's fine you feel
fine, but no reasonable person would .... They also have no concept of a
nonwaiveable conflict. Any conflict is waiveable. The example they give is
classic. They say [Accounting Firm A] can represent two enterprises
competing for one television or one local telephone license without getting
clearance. That's a nonwaiveable conflict in the world of Drinker, Biddle &
Reath.
Multidisciplinary Practices: Smart Marketing Tool or an Ethical Quagmire?, BCD
News & Comment, Apr. 19, 2000.
137. See, eg., MacCrate Report, supra note 133, at 342 (proposing that the New
York Code of Professional Responsibility be amended to "facilitate the growth of
ancillary ventures through which lawyers will be able to provide integrated
professional services to their clients' business, while protecting the public against the
risks of nonlawyer involvement in the practice of law").
138. Proponents of MDPs look to firm-level structural controls to prevent ethical
problems. See ABA MDP Commission Report, supra note 133, Recommendation 1
(proposing that MDPs be allowed as long as lawyers have the "control and authority
necessary to assure lawyer independence in the rendering of legal services") and
Recommendation 2 (explaining the implications of the "control and authority"
principle for the organizational structure of MDPs). Some argue that law firms, too,
should be required to maintain firm-level ethics controls. See Schneyer, Professional
Discipline, supra note 13, at 4-6 (arguing that law firms as entities should be subject to
professional discipline under the Model Rules, so as to encourage law firm partners to
take collective responsibility for instituting firm-level ethics controls); Schneyer, A
Tale of Four Systems, supra note 20, at 247-54 (same).
139. See Model Rules, supra note 8, R 1.1 (stating that "competent representation
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation."); Ross D. Vincenti, Self-Help Legal Software and
the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 8 Computer/L.., 185,203 (Spring 1988) (discussing
the profession's responsibility to protect the public from incompetent advice).
140. See Model Rules, supra note 8, R 1.3. A threshold question in applying the
Model Rules (especially the rules requiring competence, diligence and
confidentiality) is whether an attorney-client relationship exists. See Catherine J.
Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace" The Peril and the Promise, 49
Duke L.J. 147, 168-98, 251-52 (1999) (analyzing the components of an attorney-client
relationship and the diligence requirement).
141. See generally Lucy Schlauch Leonard, Comment, The High-Tech Legal
Practice.: Attorney-Client Communications and the Internet, 69 U. Colo. L Rev. 851
(1998) (discussing confidentiality problems created by attorneys' use of e-mail);
Jonathan Rose, Note, E-Mail Security Risks: Taking Hacks at the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 23 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 179 (1997) (discussing problems and
possible solutions to e-mail communications between attorneys and their clients);
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adequately) covered by the Model Rules, such as the profession's
responsibility to insure access to legal services,"' and the boundaries
of the profession's monopoly over the giving of legal advice.114
Juxtaposing the interprofessional conflict between lawyers and
accountants with the professional-lay conflict over the regulation of
self-help software 4 provides an opportunity to further consider the
relationship between professional knowledge and professional power.
I also have experimented with requiring students to identify
jurisdictional contests between occupations and professions other than
the legal profession, and to analyze these contests from both
Amy M. Fulmer Stevenson, Comment, Making a Wrong Turn on the Information
Superhighway: Electronic Mail, the Attorney-Client Privilege and Inadvertent
Disclosure, 26 Cap. U. L. Rev. 347 (1997) (discussing the risk of inadvertent
communication presented by attorney use of e-mail).
142. See generally Brian G. Gilpin, Attorney Advertising and Solicitation on the
Internet: Complying with Ethics Regulations and Netiquette, 13 J. Marshall J.
Computer & Info. L. 697 (1995) (discussing the ethical implications and possible
solutions of attorney advertising on the internet); David P. Vandagriff, Marketing in
Cyberspace: From Large Firms to Solos, Lawyers are Making Rain on the Internet,
A.B.A. J., July 1995, at 84 (discussing attorney marketing on the internet); William E.
Hornsby, Jr., Ethics Rules for Ads May Cover Web Sites, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 29, 1996, at
C1 (analyzing the ethical implications of law firm websites).
143. See Robert L. Ostertag, Nonlawyers Should Not Practice: Nothing Can
Substitute for the Professional Skills and Values of a Lawyer, A.B.A. J., May 1996, at
116 (arguing that the legal needs of the poor should not be met through self-help
materials, but rather are the profession's responsibility); Deborah L. Rhode, Meet
Needs with Nonlawyers: It is Time to Accept Lay Practitioners-and Regulate Them,
A.B.A. J., Jan. 1996, at 104 (arguing that self-help materials help meet the legal needs
of the poor); see also Consortium on Legal Services and the Public, American Bar
Ass'n, Legal Needs and Civil Justice: Major Findings from the Comprehensive Legal
Needs Study (1994).
144. Bar associations in some states, most notably Texas, are fighting the self-help
software industry, arguing that self-help software providers are engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law. In 1999, the Texas Unauthorized Practice of Law
Committee (UPLC) won an injunction against Parsons Technology, which publishes
Quicken Family Lawyer, a will drafting software. In a 23-page summary judgment
opinion, the district court held that the interactive software (which includes an "Ask
Arthur Miller" help feature) "adapts the content of the form to the responses given
by the user" and thus constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. See Unauthorized
Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., No. 97-CV-2859-H, 1999 WL 47235, at
*7 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999). In response to Parsons, the Texas legislature revised its
1939 unauthorized practice law to make room for legal self-help books and software.
The revised law states that written materials, books, forms, computer software or
similar products do not constitute the practice of law as long as they carry "clear and
conspicuous" labels that the products are not a substitute for an attorney. The UPLC
objects to the revised law on separation of powers grounds, arguing that the court
(that is, the UPLC) retains the ultimate authority to define what constitutes
unauthorized practice. See Polly Ross Hughes, Bill to Lay Down the Law on Self-Help
Software; Controversial Measure Reversing Statewide Ban is Awaiting Gov. Bush's
Signature, Hous. Chron., June 13, 1999, available at 1999 WL 3995519. Parsons
currently is on appeal to the Fifth Circuit.
145. One can frame this as a conflict between lawyers and consumers, or as a
conflict between lawyers and self-help publishers. I invite students to consider the
implications of each frame for regulatory policy.
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functional and conflict perspectives. Which is more important,
knowledge or power, in explaining who wins jurisdictional contests?
What type of evidence is relevant to this inquiry? Which of the
contests that we have discussed provides the best example for each
theory?
This exercise is pedagogically useful, in that it requires students to
apply the ideas that they have been learning in a new context, and
many students find the opportunity to talk about other professions
refreshing. This exercise also helps combat students' temptation to
become cynical about the legal profession. One of the most important
benefits of a sociological (that is, comparative) approach to the
subject of professional responsibility is that it places the legal
profession within a critical-but generically critical-analytical
framework. The legal profession, this framework reminds them, is not
fundamentally different from any other profession (or organized
occupational group). Lawyers' efforts to protect their shared
economic interests do not differentiate them from other occupational
groups; they are no more-and no less-self-serving than doctors,
accountants, or riverboat pilots. In an era of increasing public disdain
for lawyers,"4 students may find this a welcome insight.
2. The Current Structure of the Profession
In tracing the development of lawyers' monopoly, students already
have been alerted to several important structural characteristics of the
American legal profession. First, unlike legal professions in other
countries, the United States profession is at least formally a unified
profession. 47 The vast majority of American lawyers graduate from
ABA-approved law schools with fairly standardized curricula'" and
take the bar examination required in their jurisdiction. 49 Law schools
do not require students to declare subspecialties and there is
considerable mobility lawyers between different legal jobs.' -
Second, the percentage of lawyers engaged in private practice is
higher in the U.S. than in most other countries, with the exception of
146. See Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 163 (discussing the decline in
lawyers' prestige during the twentieth century); Chris Klein, Poll: Lawyers Not Liked,
Nat'l LJ., Aug. 25, 1997, at A6 (reporting that the percentage of people viewing the
law as an occupation "of very great prestige" dropped from 36 to 19% between 1977
and 1997).
147. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
148. Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 72, 254.
149. Id- at 52-58. As of 1985, only five states admit lawyers through -diploma
privilege," and only 1.3% of all entrants qualify via this route. Id. at 62, 263. See supra
note 87 and accompanying text.
150. See Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 175-76 (describing patterns of
career mobility among American lawyers); Abel, Lawyers in the Civil Law World,
supra note 103, at 6 (comparing the United States to civil law countries).
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Great Britain.' There is some evidence of convergence: the
percentage of lawyers engaged in private practice in the United States
(and other common law countries) is declining, whereas the
percentage in many civil law countries is increasing, but the American
profession nevertheless remains more independent from government
employment than legal professions in most other countries. 152
Finally, despite the absence of formal structural divisions within the
profession, American lawyers are highly stratified by class, race and
gender as well as by the type of client served. As students have
learned, the bar's efforts to raise requirements for entry into the
profession were tied to broader ethnic, religious and class conflicts in
nineteenth-and twentieth-century America.'53 In the late nineteenth
century, the self-appointed "decent part" of the bar was made up
almost exclusively of wealthy WASP men, and their campaigns
against "overcrowding," "corruption" and the "unqualified" (part-
time) schools were simultaneously (and often explicitly) campaigns
against immigrants, working class lawyers, and religious minorities.'54
Lawyers also are highly stratified according to the wealth, social
status and political resources of their clients. 5 5 The most prestigious
and remunerative jobs are those serving the financial interests of large
corporations, such as partnerships in large corporate law firms, and
the least prestigious and remunerative are those serving poor and
politically powerless individuals. 5 6 Moreover, students are sorted into
this client-based system of intraprofessional stratification long before
they take their first legal job: the most important determinant of
151. Abel, Lawyers in the Civil Law World, supra note 103, at 4-8.
152. Id. at 38-40, 42-43. In the early 1980s, the ratio of lawyer-civil servants to
private practitioners was 15:100 in England, 20:100 in Scotland, 1:1 in Germany, 1:1 in
Venezuela, and 106:100 in Finland, compared to 14:100 in the United States. Id. at 44-
45.
153. See Collins, supra note 25, at 95-103, 153, 155-56.
154. Id. at 153, 155-56 (discussing the role of ethnic conflict in the development of
the legal profession); see also Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 85-90
(discussing efforts to exclude immigrants and ethnic minorities from admission to the
bar); Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modem
America 106-29 (1976) (describing the conflict within the bar concerning the
admissions of minorities); Friedman, supra note 50, at 638-69 (discussing ethnic and
class divisions in the nineteenth century bar); Wayne K. Hobson, The American Legal
Profession and the Organizational Society, 1890-1930 301-04 (1986) (discussing the
conflict surrounding the admission of minorities to the bar); Stevens, supra note 59, at
74-81 (discussing the ethnic composition of part-time versus full-time schools).
155. See Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 202-07; John P. Heinz &
Edward 0. Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure of the Bar 99-101, 379-
85 (1982).
156. See Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 13, at 202-07 (reporting patterns of
stratification by type of client); Heinz & Laumann, supra note 155, at 91 (reporting
social prestige rankings of 30 fields of law) and 103 (reporting imputed characteristics
of different practice areas); 1999 NALP Report, supra note 14, at 33-40 (reporting
median starting salaries for law graduates by employer type).
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American lawyers' career track and professional status is the rank of
the law school that they attend.1
I emphasize these characteristics in explaining the current structure
of the profession, focusing primarily on the sources of stratification
within the private bar. I begin by tracing changes in the demographic
composition of the profession and reviewing the empirical literature
on the sources of gender and race stratification among lawyers.'5 This
discussion leads directly to the debate about affirmative action in law
school admissions and the appropriate role of numerical criteria such
as the LSAT. 5 9 I link the law school admissions debate to a discussion
of law school rankings and the criteria and methodology used by U.S.
News & World Report."6 From a sociological perspective, these issues
of ranking are of central relevance to the study of professions, because
they capture the chief theoretical debate about the functions and
dysfunctions of stratification. 161
I also use this section of the course to introduce students to the
variety of organizational contexts in which lawyers practice"" and the
157. In 1962, more than 70% of the lawyers in New York's leading law firms had
graduated from Harvard, Columbia or Yale. See Erwin Smigel, The Wall Street
Lawyer:. Professional Organizational Man? 39 (1969). Heinz & Laumann report
similar patterns in Chicago. See Heinz & Laumann, supra note 155, at 192.
158. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chambliss, Organizational Determinants of Law Firm
Integration, 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 669 (1997) [hereinafter Chambliss (1997)]; Elizabeth
Chambliss & Christopher Uggen, Men and Women of Elite Law Firms: Reevaluating
Kanter's Legacy, 25 Law & Soc. Inquiry 41 (2000); Deborah J. Merritt & Barbara F.
Reskin, The Double Minority: Empirical Evidence of a Double Standard in Law
School Hiring of Minority Women, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2299 (1992): Deborah J. Merritt
& Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race, and Credentials: The Truth About Affirmative Action
in Law Faculty Hiring, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 199 (1997); David B. Wilkins, Partners
Without Power? A Preliminary Look at Black Partners in Corporate Law Firms, 2 J.
Inst. for Study of Legal Ethics 15 (1999); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why
Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis,
84 Cal. L. Rev. 493 (1996). See also Chambliss (2000), supra note 14, at 9 (reviewing
the current status of minorities in the American legal profession);.
159. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045
(9th Cir. 1999); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996): Grutter v. Bollinger,
16 F. Supp. 2d 797 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 2 F. Supp. 2d
1324 (W.D. Wash. 1998). See also Richard 0. Lempert et. al., Michigan's Minority
Graduates in Practice: The River Runs Through Law School, 25 Law & Soc. Inquiry
395 (2000) (comparing the success of Michigan's minority and white law graduates,
based on income, satisfaction and public service); Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to
Diversity in Legal Education" An Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of
Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L Rev.
1, 40-45 (1997) (summarizing the validity and predictive value of LSAT scores).
160. Wendy N. Espeland, U.S. News & World Report and American Law Schools
(July 2000) (unpublished paper presented at the Biennial Meeting of the Working
Group on Comparative Legal Professions, Peyresq, France) (on file with author).
161. See supra Part II.A. (contrasting functional and conflict theories of social
stratification).
162. See Chambliss (2000), supra note 14, at 1-21 (providing an overview of the
distribution of lawyers across different employment settings); Abel, American
Lawyers, supra note 13, at 166-81 (same); Curran & Carson, supra note 18, 23-26
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importance of organizational structure and culture in shaping
individual conduct. 163 I focus particularly on the growth of law firms
and the bureaucratization of law firm structure, and the sources of
structural and cultural variation among firms."6 I also cover recent
studies of the structure of lawyers' careers, devoting special attention
to lawyers' careers within (and across) large law firms.65
My focus on large firms in part reflects the fact that a large majority
of my students begin their careers as large firm associates; thus the
organization of work and careers in such firms is relevant to most of
the class. Further, most of the recent empirical literature on the
organization of private law practice and the structure of lawyers'
careers focuses on large firm practice. 1" Part of my justification for
focusing on large law firms, however, stems from their historic
neglect-and growing importance-as a regulatory target. As noted
above, the Model Rules are based on an individualistic paradigm that
arose in an era in which most lawyers practiced alone or in two-man
partnerships." As a result, the Rules have little to say about the
(same); 1999 NALP Report, supra note 14, at 27-40 (examining the distribution of
1998 law graduates across different employment settings).
163. On the effects of organizational culture on lawyers' values and conduct, see
Michael J. Kelly, The Lives of Lawyers: Journeys in the Organizations of Practice 18,
207-21 (1994) (arguing that the culture or "house norms" of practice organizations
profoundly affects individual conduct and professional values). See also Robert L.
Nelson & David M. Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism: The Professional Ideologies of
Lawyers in Context, in Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices: Transformations in the
American Legal Profession 198-214 (Robert L. Nelson et al., eds., 1992) (arguing that
the definition of "professionalism" depends on organizational and institutional
context); Schiltz, supra note 129, at 906-20 (arguing that large firm lawyers' practice
norms are determined primarily by law firm culture); Kim Taylor-Thompson,
Individual Actor v. Institutional Player: Alternating Visions of the Public Defender, 84
Geo. L.J. 2419 (1996) (discussing organizational constraints on public defenders). On
the effects of corporate culture on individual business ethics, see generally John M.
Darley, How Organizations Socialize Individuals into Evildoing, in Codes of Conduct:
Behavioral Research Into Business Ethics 13-43 (David M. Messick & Ann E.
Tenbrunsel, eds., 1996); Diane Vaughan, Rational Choice, Situated Action, and the
Social Control of Organizations, 32 Law & Soc'y Rev. 23 (1998).
164. See Chambliss (1997), supra note 158, at 713-24 (discussing structural
variations across firms); Galanter & Palay, Why the Big Get Bigger, supra note 132, at
756-65 (same); Nelson, supra note 132, at 37-124 (discussing the changing economic
and social structure of large law firms).
165. See Heinz & Laumann, supra note 155, at 167-208 (discussing the patterns of
lawyers' careers); see also Nelson, supra note 132, at 127-58 (discussing recruitment
and career development in large law firms); Jerry Van Hoy, Franchise Law Firms and
the Transformation of Personal Legal Services 27-50 (1997) (discussing career
patterns in franchise law firms); National Association for Law Placement, Keeping
the Keepers: Strategies for Associate Retention in Times of Attrition: A Best
Practices National Research Study on Lawyer Careers (1998).
166. But see Seron, supra note 129; Van Hoy, supra note 165.
167. See supra note 20 and accompanying text; see also David B. Wilkins, Everyday
Practice Is the Troubling Case: Confronting Context in Legal Ethics, in Everyday
Practice and Trouble Cases 68-108 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter
Wilkins, Everyday Practice Is the Troubling Case] (arguing that the traditional view of
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professional responsibilities of professional organizations such as law
firms.
This is likely to change in the near future. Recently, two states, New
York and New Jersey, amended their rules of professional conduct to
include the regulation of law firms as entities. In 1996, New York
amended its disciplinary rules to extend to law firms the same
prohibitions against unethical conduct that apply to individual
lawyers."6 The New York rules also establish an entity-level duty of
supervision, requiring law firms to "make reasonable efforts to ensure
that all lawyers in the firm conform to the disciplinary rules."'' In
1998, New Jersey followed New York, when the Supreme Court of
New Jersey amended the Rules of Court to allow for the imposition of
ethical sanctions on law firms, including fines in "exceptional
circumstances. '17 The amended rules provide that "every attorney
and business entity authorized to practice law in the State of New
Jersey... shall be subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. 17
1
The ABA Standing Committee on Professional Discipline also
recently considered (and rejected) a proposal for law firm discipline as
part of its year 2000 amendments to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct."7 Like the New York rules, the Standing Committee's
proposal would have made law firms subject to general disciplinary
enforcement, and created an entity duty of supervision." Under this
duty, firms would be required to have in effect measures giving
reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules
of Professional Conduct:
This presumably would include... systems for checking conflicts of
interest... [and] a means for updating conflicts of interest data... ;
procedures for quality control of product created by new
lawyers as independent professionals is antiquated and overdrawn and urging a new
approach to the study of professional ethics).
168. See N.Y. DR 1-102(A) (providing examples of misconduct to be applied to
individual lawyers or law firms); New York Adopts New Rules Subjecting Firms to
Discipline, 12 ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct 191-7 (June 12,
1996).
169. N.Y. DR 1-104(A). Similar rules were considered in 1996 by the State Bar of
California, but were shelved when Governor Pete Wilson vetoed state bar dues
legislation. See Mark Hansen, Taking a Firm Hand in Discipline. New York Ethics
Rules Pinpoint Law Firms-Some Say More States Should Follow, A.B.A.J. 24 (Sept.
1998).
170. See New Jersey Practice 1, Court Rules Annotated (Rule 1:20-150)) (Klock
5th ed. 1999). The change was prompted in part by the Supreme Court's reprimand of
national personal injury firm Jacoby & Meyers the previous year. See Dana Coleman,
Fines for Firms? On the Horizon! New Jersey Law., Dec. 15, 1997.
171. New Jersey Practice 1, Court Rules Annotated (Rule 1:20-1) (Klock 5th ed.
1999).
172. See ABA Standing Committee on Professional Discipline, Report to House of




associates... ; and adequate systems for ensuring proper and
appropriate billing of clients and the proper handling of clients'
funds... 174
The primary impetus for law firm discipline is concern about ethical
accountability in large law firms. Under the current rules, large firm
lawyers are practically immune from professional discipline. 17'
Because of the nature of large firm practice, it is often difficult to
pinpoint responsibility for ethical violations that occur in large firms.
Lawyers tend to work in teams with loose organization, little formal
supervision, and diffuse responsibility for decision-making. 176 Holding
individual lawyers accountable for ethical lapses in this context in
some cases may amount to scapegoating. 177
Further, many of the ethical issues large firm lawyers face (such as
conflicts of interest, billing and discovery abuse) are matters governed
by firm-wide policy. Thus, the line between ethics and management
blurs. As Ted Schneyer writes, "[the] quality of lawyering today often
depends not just on individual skills and values ... but also on a law
firm's management and committee structure, its firm-wide or
departmental policies, and its standard operating procedures. 17 s
Future generations of lawyers inevitably will be forced to grapple
with issues of law firm management in a context of increasing
professional (and external) regulation. The emergence of new
organizational forms such as multidisciplinary partnerships can only
hasten the arrival of a new entity-level regulatory paradigm.'79
Neglecting this topic in the one required law school course on
professional responsibility therefore does students (and the
profession) a serious disservice.
C. The System of Professional Regulation
This all sounds fine, the reader is thinking, but does she ever teach
them the rules? The short answer (I now confess) is no. At least, I do
not organize any part of the course (including this section on
professional regulation), around a comprehensive survey of the
current Model Rules. Instead, I organize this section around specific
174. Id.
175. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
176. See Galanter & Palay, Why the Big Get Bigger, supra note 132, at 748.
177. See Schneyer, Professional Discipline, supra note 13, at 19-20; Report to
House of Delegates, supra note 172, at 5-6 (discussing the infirmities of the current
system). The current rules "expose individual lawyers to discipline for activities
conducted or authorized either by other lawyers in their firm or by a decision of the
firm's or legal department's hierarchy. This discipline may be imposed even where the
respondent lawyer may have objected to, or even been unaware of, the offending
conduct." Id.
178. Schneyer, A Tale of Four Systems, supra note 20, at 252-53.
179. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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ethical and regulatory problems, with coverage dictated in part by
student demand.
I begin by providing students with a comparative overview of the
regulatory system, based on David Wilkins' classic article, Who
Should Regulate Lawyers?"m Wilkins identifies four categories of
professional regulation- disciplinary controls, liability controls,
institutional controls, and legislative controls 81 - and compares their
strengths and weaknesses for addressing particular regulatory
problems."8 I couple excerpts from Wilkins' article with excerpts from
Ted Schneyer's article, A Tale of Four Systems: Reflections on How
Law Influences the "Ethical Infrastructure" of Law Firms,'s3 which
compares the effectiveness of professional discipline, judicial
regulation, agency regulation and civil liability as sources of entity
regulation." 4 Together these articles provide an excellent framework
for in-depth inquiries into specific ethical and regulatory problems.
I follow the introduction of this framework by asking students to
write an ethics code for law students and propose a means for
enforcing it. I require them to: (1) identify specific ethical and/or
regulatory problems with law student conduct; (2) research existing
regulation relevant to the issues that they have identified (including
honor codes and other law school and/or university regulation, as well
as any ABA or AALS regulation that might apply); (3) propose
standards for compliance and mechanisms for enforcement (including
specification of regulators and sanctions); and (4) identify the
contribution of the strategy that they propose to the overall regulatory
system. An allowable response to this assignment is to propose that no
new code be adopted, but students taking this approach still must
identify specific ethical problems arising in the law school context, andjustify the no-code strategy in terms of existing regulation.
This has been an extremely successful assignment at both schools
where I have tried it. Students enjoy identifying specific problems,
some serious (cheating, harassment) and some more humorous
(gunning in class, sucking up to faculty). The divisions that emerge-
between top and middling students, students on different career
tracks, and students with different values-provide an opportunity to
review sources of division within the profession and the implications
of these divisions for professional self-regulation. s5 Considering the
180. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 12.
181. See id at 805-09.
182. Id at 822-47.
183. Schneyer, A Tale of Four Systems, supra note 20.
184. See id. at 245-46.
185. See generally Theodore Schneyer, Professionalism as Politics: The Making of a
Modem Legal Ethics Code, in Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers Practices: Transformations in
the American Legal Profession 95-143 (Robert L. Nelson, et al. eds., 1992) (discussing




potential contribution of a formal ethics code also provides an
opportunity to identify sources of informal regulation, such as peer
and market pressure and law school socialization.
I devote the remainder of the section on professional regulation
(about one-third of total class hours) to in-depth analyses of specific
ethical and regulatory problems raised by students. In the first week
of class, I survey students about their intended careers. (By the second
or third year of law school, most students have a general idea about
the type of law they want to practice, or their intended non-legal
career, and the type of organization in which they intend to work.) I
require students to identify a specific ethical or regulatory problem
associated with their intended practice, and to write a short essay
critically reviewing the content of current regulation.186 I then fix a
schedule for discussion during this section of the course. I organize
coverage of student essays by employment sector: private practice
(organizational client sector); private practice (individual client
sector); and public sector employment. Half of the grade in the course
is based on this and other written projects (such as the project on
interprofessional competition'87 and the student ethics code,' noted
above).
I do not actually require students to make oral presentations.
Instead, I require them to turn in their essays a week before our
coverage of their intended employment sector begins, and to be on
call as a regulatory expert on the day that their topic is discussed.
Typically, I group two or three topics together to serve as the content
for each class period. I make all information presented in class fair
game for the final exam (the other half of the grade for the course).
I conclude this section on the system of professional regulation by
requiring students to turn in written comments relating the material
presented to previous sections of the course. I use these comments as
a vehicle for reviewing the entire course. I typically spend the last two
class periods on this comprehensive review.
III. RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS
A. What About the MPRE?
Most students initially are suspicious of the sociological approach. I
tell them explicitly on the first day of class that the course is not
186. I do not allow duplication of topics and award popular topics (e.g., sex with
clients) to first comers.
187. See supra Part II.B.1.
188. See id..
189. See Levin, supra note 9, at 396 (stating that the MPRE "may be more
challenging for applicants who actually know something about state professional
responsibility rules than for those who do not").
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intended to-nor will it-sufficiently prepare them for the MPRE. I
also make clear that the course is demanding, requiring several
written projects in addition to a final exam. A few students
immediately switch to another professor after reading the syllabus,
but not as many as one might expect. No more than normally switch
out of law classes during the first week. Despite their suspicion,
students are curious about the subject matter of the course, and many
are eager to avoid the alternative; that is, the traditional rule-by-rule
course.
The tension between bar exam preparation and free intellectual
curiosity nevertheless persists throughout the semester, as it does in
all law school courses. Adopting a sociological approach does not
exacerbate this tension, but simply resolves it in favor of intellectual
curiosity at the expense of bar exam preparation, rather than the
other way around. I justify this pedagogical choice on two grounds.
First, as a normative, professional matter-here the profession of
interest being law teaching-the MPRE should not drive law teaching
on the subject of professional responsibility. The MPRE is seriously
deficient as a measure of anything other than a superficial mastery of
the Model Rules.189 Its coverage is narrow; it tests "model" or
hypothetical rules that do not necessarily apply in the jurisdiction in
which students will practice (or, in some cases, in any jurisdiction);"~
and it covers some topics that are inapplicable to graduates about to
enter the profession (such as judicial ethics). 9 Further, teaching
"professional responsibility" as if it could be reduced to rules
completely trivializes the subject and encourages "tunnel vision"
among students.192
Instead, law teachers (and law schools, as professional institutions)
have a professional responsibility to improve teaching on the
profession, and to take the lead in identifying and addressing its
ethical and regulatory problems.19 3 There is some evidence that this is
already occurring: in the past ten years, there have been numerous
190. ld. at 404-05 (arguing that the MPRE's focus on "model" rules makes it
difficult for students to take it seriously, and is "somewhat akin to requiring them to
sit for bar exams that test them on the law of a mythical jurisdiction").
191. Id. at 397 n.8 (stating that 10-15% of the MPRE focuses on judicial ethics,
despite the fact that less than one percent of all lawyers are state court judges).
192 See Cramton & Koniak, supra note 19, at 171; Levin, supra note 9, at 405;
David A. Logan, Upping the Ante" Curricular and Bar Exaim Reform in Professional
Responsibility, 56 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1023, 1028 (1999) (arguing that many of the
most important questions of professional responsibility "cannot be answered by
reference to any ABA code" (emphasis omitted)).
193. See generally Cramton & Koniak, supra note 19; Russell G. Pearce, Teaching
Ethics Seriously: Legal Ethics as the Most Important Subject in Law School, 29 Loy. U.
Chi. LJ. 719 (1998); Rhode, supra note 19; David B. Wilkins, The Professional
Responsibility of Professional Schools to Study and Teach About the Profession, 49 J.




symposia (such as this one) devoted to the subject of professional
ethics and the improvement of ethics teaching in law school.'94 There
also have been recent efforts to reform the MPRE, to make it more
inclusive of the "law governing lawyers," rather than focusing only on
the ABA Model Rules. 195 Professional responsibility teachers should
build upon this momentum, rather than deferring to demands for
MPRE preparation.
The second justification for privileging intellectual curiosity over
bar exam preparation is that the MPRE is a relatively easy exam. It is
scored on a 150-point scale, and roughly half of all jurisdictions
require only a 75 to pass.196 (After all, how would it look to
nonlawyers if a large proportion of would-be lawyers consistently
flunked the ethics exam?) Most professional responsibility teachers
are probably familiar with the all-purpose tip for passing the MPRE:
when in doubt, pick "the second most ethical answer."'" As one
professional responsibility teacher notes, "a few hours with bar review
materials is all that it takes for a student to get his or her MPRE ticket
punched."'1 98
B. What About the Model Rules?
A more serious objection to the sociological approach is that it
provides insufficient coverage of the issues raised by the Model Rules.
I offer several responses to this objection. First, the course does cover
a number of issues traditionally covered in professional responsibility,
both in the section on the history and structure of the profession, 19
and in the section devoted specifically to the regulatory system. A full
third of the course is devoted to covering specific ethical and
regulatory issues associated with different employment sectors. The
chief difference between the course I propose and the traditional
survey course, besides total time allotted, is in the organization of
coverage. Instead of beginning with-and building out from-the
individual lawyer-client relationship, the sociological approach begins
with-and builds in from-the social organization of the profession.2°°
Second, in terms of time allotted, no single course can do justice to
the issues raised by the Model Rules, much less to the "law of
194. See Symposium, Teaching Legal Ethics, 58 Law and Contemp. Probs. (Thomas
B. Metzloff & David B. Wilkins eds., Summer/Autumn 1995).
195. See Levin, supra note 9, at 409-10.
196. National Conference of Bar Examiners, The MPRE Information Booklet 1
(2000); see also Logan, supra note 192, at 1031 n.37 (reporting that over 80% of
examinees score high enough to pass in any jurisdiction).
197. See Logan, supra note 192, at 1030; Rhode, supra note 19, at 41.
198. Logan, supra note 192, at 1030-31.
199. See supra Part II.B.l.c.
200. See Wilkins, Everyday Practice Is the Troubling Case, supra note 167, at 70-97
(critiquing the traditional approach from the perspective of sociolegal scholarship).
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lawyering" more broadly2 1 Professional responsibility, broadly
defined, ideally would be taught by the so-called "pervasive
method";' that is, integrated into the law school curriculum as a key
feature of every course. As others have noted, professional
responsibility is the only law school subject that will be relevant to all
lawyers' careers.' If there is not enough room in the one required
course on professional responsibility to cover the basic history and
structure of the profession itself, and to provide students with a
theoretical framework for understanding this history and structure,
then additional courses should be required.
In the meantime, I defend my allocation of time to the sociology of
the profession on two grounds. First, although the sociological course
that I have outlined does not survey the Model Rules, it does provide
in-depth coverage of the rules (and law of lawyering) most relevant to
students' intended careers. This targeted approach keeps students'
interest and builds on their summer practice experiences.
Second, the sociological approach equips students to spot issues
that they have not covered, find the applicable regulatory standards,
and work through their application. In this respect, the approach I am
pitching is more "traditional" than the traditional course. The "case
method" made popular by Langdell emphasizes fundamental
principles and the development of an analytic framework (at the
expense of survey coverage), so that students will be able to apply
legal principles "with constant facility and certainty to the evertangled
skein of human affairs."' This approach recognizes that the specific
content of law and other regulation varies across jurisdictions and
inevitably will change over time. This is no less true for professional
regulation than for any other area of law. Indeed, the ABA currently
is engaged in a wide-ranging effort to amend the Model Rules3- In
this context, it is the traditional survey course that requires a defense.
Finally, one might argue that the sociological approach suffers from
a lack of emphasis on the moral and philosophical aspects of
professional responsibility. I have purposely shied away from the use
of the term "ethics" in this essay, and I shy away from it in the course
as well. In part this reflects my skepticism that one can teach adults to
be ethical by way of a law school course-a criticism that is often
raised about the professional responsibility requirement.
201. See Rhode, supra note 19, at 50-52 (discussing the inherent limitations of any
single ethics course); Levin, supra note 9, at 406,408 (same).
202. See generally Rhode, supra note 19 (making the case for the pervasive
method).
203. See Pearce, supra note 193, at 735-36.
204. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
205. Hurst, supra note 44, at 262 (quoting Langdell).
206. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
207. See Pearce, supra note 193, at 732-35 (reviewing and responding to this
critique); Rhode, supra note 19, at 44-48 (same).
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Nevertheless, I can see the argument for a moral-philosophical
approach to the subject of professional responsibility. Though one
may not be able to teach adults to be ethical (or even conscientious),
one can expose them to the issues and channel whatever good
intentions they already have.
The chief response I have on this point is that the sociological
approach does expose students to important moral issues, but it
focuses on the moral responsibilities of the profession as a whole, and
of lawyers as members of a profession, rather than treating individual
lawyers as if they operated independently of any organizational or
professional context. The sociological approach thus makes explicit
the organizational, professional and societal implications of lawyers'
individual actions, as well as alerting students to the external pressures
that can lead to unethical behavior. In my view, this approach better-
equips students to identify and address the moral implications of their
individual practice than a course organized around abstract issues of
individual morality.
C. Faculty Competence
Another objection that I can imagine to the sociological approach-
one that I have heard, in fact-is that you need to be a sociologist to
teach it. This is not the case. Although, as a credentialed sociologist, I
would like to believe that it helps, as a sociologist of the professions, I
have been trained to question the relationship between credentials
and skill.
The fact is, any law professor with sufficient interest could teach
this course. For people who already are teaching professional
responsibility, it requires only a few adjustments, mainly at the
beginning of the course. The most important components of the
sociological approach are: (1) the theoretical framework; (2) a
commitment to comparative analysis; and (3) a commitment to
grounding ethical and regulatory issues in a robust empirical context.
The theoretical framework is laid out above; students can learn it in
a week. In my experience, the sociological framework comes naturally
to law students. Students' lives in law school are all about the
relationship between knowledge and power: the relationship between
studying and grades; the relationship between faculty and students;
the relationship between credentials and jobs. (Law professors'
professional lives arguably have a little something to do with this
relationship as well.)
The comparative framework has several dimensions: comparisons
between American lawyers in different historical periods,
comparisons between American lawyers and lawyers in other
countries, and comparisons between the legal profession and other
occupations and professions. One can teach the entire course by
comparison, which is what I try to do, but one could also be more
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sparing with course coverage in this regard. The comparative
framework is more important than any particular content; the point is
to keep reminding students of key theoretical issues by stepping back,
every so often, away from the particulars of any one issue, any one
era, and any one profession.
The empirical component requires teachers to have a working
knowledge of the empirical literature on the profession, and no doubt
many do. Although I have caricatured the traditional approach for
purposes of comparison, I suspect that most professional
responsibility teachers already cover at least some aspects of the
history and structure of the profession, and few would claim that such
topics are completely irrelevant to the subject. Still, this is probably
the component that, when taken seriously, is likely to raise the
strongest objection from adherents to the traditional approach. Is it
appropriate to sacrifice coverage of the Model Rules in order to
provide coverage of historical and sociological studies of the
profession?
I submit that it is not only appropriate, but that it is inappropriate
to do otherwise. The ABA accreditation standard requires that all
students in the J.D. program receive instruction in "the history, goals,
structure, duties, values, and responsibilities of the legal profession
and its members, including instruction in the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.... "2s Based on this standard, one could argue
that half the course should be devoted to history, goals and structure,
with the other half being reserved for duties, values and
responsibilities.
Moreover, law schools have a professional responsibility to educate
students about the profession; one that they currently are failing to
fulfill.2° Though there have been some important innovations in
teaching professional responsibility, on the whole law schools still
exhibit little institutional commitment to research and teaching on the
profession. As a result, most students graduate with only the
sketchiest information about the norms and conditions of law practice
and the many challenges that they will face. The sociological approach
is designed to begin to address this "ethical failure" by the legal
academy. As Wilkins writes:
[T]he law school's systematic and pervasive failure to study and
teach about the profession ... is more than just a pedagogical
oversight or a scholarly shortcoming. Instead, it is nothing less than
an ethical failure by the legal academy to meet the legitimate needs
of its three principal constituencies-students, the bar, and society.
At a time when the American legal profession is being radically
208. American Bar Association Standards for Approval of Law Schools &
Interpretations 302(b) (1996).
209. See Wilkins, The Professional Responsibility of Professional Schools, supra
note 193, at 76.
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transformed on almost every dimension, law schools can no longer
credibly assert that by simply teaching students to "think like
lawyers" they have given their graduates all the tools-or even the
most important tools-that they will need to become successful and
satisfied practitioners. If individual lawyers, the bar, and the public
we serve are to emerge from this time of change with a legal
profession capable of meeting the enormous challenges it now faces,
then the legal academy must become an active participant in
developing and transmitting the empirical and theoretical
knowledge about legal practice that will allow us to construct a
vision of legal professionalism fit for the twenty-first century instead
of for the nineteenth.21 °
D. Workload
Finally, a note on workload. The sociological approach is more
demanding of students and faculty than the traditional approach. To
be successful, it requires student engagement and the tailoring of
course content to specific student interests, which in turn requires
periodic written assignments in addition to a final exam. I have
mentioned several assignments that I use: requiring students to
identify jurisdictional conflicts involving professions other than the
legal profession, requiring students to write an ethics code for law
students and propose a means of enforcing it, and requiring students
to write an essay on a specific ethical or regulatory problem associated
with their intended practice. I refer to these structured assignments as
"projects." I also typically require students to write "comments" at
various points in the course, such as comments tying the various
sections of the course together. I do not impose any structure on
"comments," except that they must address the reading (or some point
of class discussion), rather than simply describing or summarizing it.
Some students balk at the workload and switch courses
immediately. In general, however, I have been successful in
persuading students that it will not be too bad, and here I hope to
persuade readers (as potential teachers) as well. First, I impose page
limits on all assignments: two single-spaced pages for "projects" and
one single-spaced page for "comments." Page limits take the pressure
off students and limit the time that it takes to grade and comment on
their submissions. Second, I grade all "projects" on a five-point scale,
and "comments" on a three-point scale, with any thoughtful effort
earning a 4 (in the case of projects) or a 2 (in the case of comments).
Thus, I emphasize effort and timely completion of the assignment
rather than style, neatness, or length. I write comments in the margins
of all submissions, and hand them back at the beginning of the class in
which the topic is to be discussed. I find that this exchange with
210. Id. at 76-77.
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students greatly improves both the quantity and quality of class
participation.
Finally, I tailor the number of assignments required to the size of
the class. Although I always require all students to write about a
specific ethical or regulatory problem associated with their intended
practice, the submission and grading of this project is staggered
according to the employment sector that the student intends to enter.
Thus my workload for this particular project occurs in three small
clumps, about two weeks apart, rather than all at once. I fix the
number of additional projects according to the size of the class. For
big classes, I might require only one additional project, allowing
students to choose between the jurisdictional project and the ethics
code project (and requiring them to sign up in advance). For smaller
classes, I might require all three, and make the projects component of
the course count more than half of the final grade. Or, I might require
each student to turn in three sets of comments, one during each main
section of the course.
The main point is that it is relatively easy to design a manageable
grading system based on periodic written assignments. Indeed, despite
the carping I always get at the beginning of the course, many students
tell me at the end how much they enjoyed the written exchange and
my attention to their individual interests. Further, despite the
additional work that the written assignments create for me, I find that
the exchange with students significantly enriches my own thinking and
the substance of the course.
CONCLUSION
The Mississippi is well worth reading about. It is not a commonplace
river, but on the contrary is in all ways remarkable.2"1
In this essay, I have pitched the virtues of a "sociological" approach
to teaching professional responsibility, as well as the virtues of the
sociology of the legal profession more broadly. I am enthusiastic
about the subject, and like all enthusiasts cannot imagine that others,
if properly exposed, can resist its attractions. My students, on the
whole, have rewarded my optimism. At the risk of sounding self-
congratulatory, most students love this course. They attend, they
work, they give rave reviews. And they leave, I think, with pride and
interest in the profession they have chosen. What better preparation
could be offered for maintaining high standards of professional
conduct, both individually and as stewards of a mighty profession?
211. Twain, supra note 1, at 1.
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